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ABSTRACT
We live in an era of widening geographic inequality. Around the
country, the spread between economically and culturally thriving places
and those that are struggling has been increasing. “Superstar” cities like
New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Atlanta continue to attract talent
and grow, while the economies of other cities and rural areas are left
behind. Troublingly, escalating geographic inequality in the United
States has arrived hand in hand with serious economic, social, and
political problems. Areas that are left behind have not only failed to keep
up with their thriving peers; in many ways, they have stagnated and seen
opportunities evaporate. At the same time, superstar cities are running
up against extreme housing affordability problems, rendering middleclass life all but unsustainable. To make matters worse, the widening gulf
between dynamic and stagnant places increasingly feeds into a
democratic crisis of unrepresentative government at the federal level.
The dominant explanations for widening geographic inequality
focus largely on inexorable economic trends. Forces like “agglomeration
effects” and globalization have reshaped the economy, benefitting some
areas and harming others. We think these explanations leave out a
crucial factor: the effects of specific regulatory choices on economic
geography. The Progressive Era and New Deal regulatory order in the
United States promoted geographic dispersion of economic activity. The
unraveling of this regulatory order around 1980 coincided with the
reversal in geographic convergence and the beginning of an era of
growing divergence. More specifically, regulatory policies in the areas of
transportation, communications, trade, and antitrust helped construct an
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era of geographic convergence in the mid-twentieth century, and
deregulation in those same areas contributed to the rise of geographic
inequality over the last generation. Though the COVID-19 pandemic
has produced unprecedented awareness of and interest in remote work—
raising the possibility of greater economic dispersion—the extent to
which this potential can be realized will likely also depend upon
regulatory choices. To combat geographic inequality and its attendant
downsides, we make the case for reincorporating geographic factors into
federal regulatory policymaking in transportation, communications,
trade, antitrust, and other domains.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of widening geographic inequality. Around the
country, the spread between economically and culturally thriving
places and those that are struggling has been increasing. “Superstar”
cities1 like New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Atlanta continue to
attract talent and grow, while the economies of other cities and rural
areas are left behind. This phenomenon has captured popular
imagination2 and is borne out by the data.3
Troublingly, escalating geographic inequality in the United States
has arrived hand in hand with serious economic, social, political, and
national security problems. Areas that are left behind have not only
failed to keep up with their thriving peers; in many ways, they have
stagnated and seen opportunities evaporate. Health disparities closely
track regional inequality,4 and rates of opioid abuse are higher in
communities with fewer economic opportunities.5 Educational
attainment also tracks geography. “Right now,” as one researcher

1. See Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer & Todd Sinai, Superstar Cities, 5 AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POL’Y 167, 169 (2013) (“Locations that experience persistently high house price growth
relative to housing unit growth are called ‘superstars.’”). The term “superstar cities” has grown in
popularity and now generally refers to thriving cities, mostly located on the coasts. See, e.g., Richard
Florida, Why America’s Richest Cities Keep Getting Richer, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/richard-florida-winner-take-all-new-urban-crisis/
522630 [https://perma.cc/P9LZ-WLB5] (adopting the term “superstar cities” to refer generally to
thriving places).
2. See Ben Kenigsberg, ‘Mortal Engines’ Review: London Becomes a Death Star on Wheels,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2zYsrar [https://perma.cc/T47U-F5EB] (“‘Mortal
Engines’ takes place . . . [in] the era of ‘municipal Darwinism,’ when ‘predator cities’ rove on
wheels and ‘ingest’ smaller ones, assimilating their populations and looting the spoils. In the
opening sequence, London devours a Bavarian mining town. The allegorical potential seems
obvious. Do rural areas fear urban domination?”).
3. See infra discussion Part I.
4. See, e.g., Gopal K. Singh, Gem P. Daus, Michelle Allender, Christine T. Ramey, Elijah
K. Martin, Jr., Chrisp Perry, Andrew A. De Los Reyes & Ivy P. Vedamuthu, Social Determinants
of Health in the United States: Addressing Major Health Inequality Trends for the Nation, 19352016, 6 INT’L J. MCH & AIDS 139, 148 (2017) (“Geographic differences in all-cause and
[cardiovascular disease (“CVD”)] mortality show higher risks of CVD mortality in the
Southeastern region of the US even though mortality rates have declined in all regions and states
. . . .”).
5. See, e.g., ROBIN GHERTNER & LINCOLN GROVES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE OPIOID CRISIS AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC
TRENDS 5 (2018), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/259261/ASPEEconomicOpportunity
OpioidCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL2T-3P5X] (“Counties with higher poverty and
unemployment rates generally had higher rates of retail opioid sales and Medicare opioid
prescriptions, as well as drug overdose deaths and opioid-related hospitalizations.”).
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describes, “there exists an almost ironclad link between a child’s ZIP
code and her chances of success.”6 At the same time, superstar cities
are running up against extreme housing affordability problems,
rendering middle-class life all but unsustainable.7 Taken together,
these trends suggest a startling imbalance or maldistribution of
economic growth and opportunity.
These geographic trends also increasingly feed into our
dysfunctional national politics. Thriving areas are now reliably
Democratic—even Orange County, California, previously a
Republican stronghold, went Democratic in the 2018 congressional
midterms and remained Democratic in 20208—while rural America
votes Republican by increasing margins.9 Importantly, because less
populous states wield influence in the Senate and Electoral College
that is disproportionate to their populations, partisan sorting
contributes to a crisis of unrepresentative government.
Geographic inequality also poses a risk to national security,
emergency preparedness, and resilience. When industries are

6. See Corydon Ireland, The Costs of Inequality: Education’s the One Key That Rules Them
All, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 15, 2016) (quoting James E. Ryan, Dean of Harvard Graduate School
of Education), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-costs-of-inequality-educationsthe-one-key-that-rules-them-all [https://perma.cc/YEZ9-ZLP5]; Singh et al., supra note 4, at 142–43
(“Geographic patterns in educational attainment indicate that the population in the Southeastern
region of the US has had the lowest percentage of adults with a college degree although education
levels in all regions have improved over time . . . .”).
7. See Conor Dougherty, California is Booming. Why Are So Many Californians Unhappy?,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2tevpa6 [https://perma.cc/KL5W-NBMD] (noting that
while California’s economy “has grown more than previous generations had thought possible,”
the state “has mostly put higher-value jobs . . . in expensive coastal enclaves, while pushing lowerpaid workers and lower-cost housing to inland areas like the Central Valley,” and describing the
“challenge of continuing to add jobs without affordable places for middle- and lower-income
workers to live”).
8. See Adam Nagourney & Robert Gebeloff, In Orange County, a Republican Fortress Turns
Democratic, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2RoBn2K [https://perma.cc/GTZ2-QK7Y];
Stephanie Lai, Luke Money & Joe Mozingo, Orange County Backed Biden, but Republicans Poised
for Dramatic Comeback After ‘Blue Wave,’ L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020, 11:01 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-07/orange-county-went-for-biden-but-the-bluewave-might-all-but-disappear [https://perma.cc/9KYN-B89X] (“Democrats have made inroads over
the last 30 years and now have a 3.5% advantage in voter registration that is likely to continue to
grow. But the GOP is still a potent force in Orange County . . . .”).
9. See Shirsho Dasgupta, See How Rural Voters Have Shifted To the GOP over the Last
Three Presidential Elections, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Nov. 22, 2016, 5:16 PM),
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/election/article237003749.html
[https://perma.cc/66N3-BV93] (“Donald Trump’s massive victories in rural America in the
2016 election are part of a decade-long trend that has favored the GOP.”).
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concentrated in a small number of locations, they are more vulnerable
to attack from foreign adversaries or to natural disasters and crises.
Supply chains that rely on a single city or region might be disrupted in
the event of a hurricane. An attack on the electric grid of a city or
region could hamper entire sectors of the national—or even global—
economy.
Why is geographic inequality growing? The dominant
explanations from scholars and commentators are largely about
inexorable economic trends. Forces like globalization have reshaped
the economy, benefitting some areas and harming others.10
Commentators also discuss the “inescapable reality of
agglomeration”—the disproportionate benefit that comes from
colocating in thriving areas.11 When tech companies locate their
headquarters in San Francisco, they find an available pool of talented
workers—less so in St. Louis.12 Given these economic pressures, many
commentators believe that it might not be possible to reverse the
trends in geographic inequality.13
We think these explanations, which focus on autonomous
economic forces, leave out a crucial factor: the effects of specific
regulatory choices on economic geography. In numerous ways, the
Progressive Era and New Deal regulatory order in the United States
promoted geographic dispersion in economic activity. The unraveling
of this regulatory order around 1980 coincided with the reversal in
geographic economic convergence and the beginning of an era of
growing divergence.14 More specifically, regulatory policies in the areas
of transportation, communications, trade, and antitrust helped
10. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2upzklF [https://perma.cc/RRZ6-Q988] (“[F]actory jobs
can no longer keep small-town America afloat . . . [in competition against r]obots and workers in
China . . . .”).
11. Id.; see also Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L.
REV. 467, 469 (2018) (“Human beings should live in places where they are most productive, and
megacities, where information, innovation, and opportunities congregate, would be the optimal
choice.” (footnote omitted)).
12. See generally ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012) (noting that
regional inequality comes from the coexistence of innovative people and markets rewarding
innovation).
13. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The New Economy and the Trump Rump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19,
2018), https://nyti.ms/2zfOAjZ [https://perma.cc/QR6K-UBK3] (“[R]estoring these regions’
dynamism is much harder, because it means swimming against a powerful economic tide.”);
Porter, supra note 10 (quoting various experts to similar effect).
14. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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construct an era of geographic convergence in the mid-twentieth
century and deregulation in those same areas contributed to the rise of
geographic inequality over the last generation.
Our argument that regulatory design can powerfully influence
economic geography has profound implications for current legal and
policy debates. To the extent that the legal literature has addressed the
problem of geographic inequality, it has largely been in the context of
municipal land use and zoning. Leading scholars in this area have
helped shape what has become an elite consensus in favor of loosening
land-use controls to enable people in left-behind places to move to
economically thriving cities.15 We argue, however, that such solutions
are likely to deepen geographic inequality and its negative
consequences and may come with their own unexamined problems.
Policymakers should not view land-use reform as a panacea, especially
if it is not coupled with a broader package of policies that address the
sources and consequences of geographic inequality. Outside the legal
academy, some economists emphasize place-based tax policies to
improve conditions in left-behind places, and others briefly note that
deregulation in antitrust and transportation might contribute to
geographic inequality.16 But strikingly, these scholars and analysts do
not call for re-regulation or even incorporating geographic
considerations into regulatory policy. Indeed, one set of these
commentators proposes further deregulation.17 By contrast, we argue
that policymakers need to take much more seriously the fact that
specific forms of regulation can alleviate geographic inequality, and
deregulation can exacerbate it.
These arguments go against the dominant strain of thinking about
geographic inequality.18 On one conventional economic story, regional

15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part II.
18. This is not to say that we are the first or only ones to identify this relationship. A number
of journalists and activists have offered compelling, well-written, popular arguments along these
lines. See, e.g., Phillip Longman, Bloom and Bust, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov.–Dec. 2015 [hereinafter
Longman, Bloom and Bust], https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novdec-2015/bloom-andbust [https://perma.cc/MZ6K-QC9F]; Phillip Longman, Why the Economic Fates of America’s
Cities Diverged, ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/
11/cities-economic-fates-diverge/417372 [https://perma.cc/4L6T-U2E6]; Sarah Miller & Austin
Frerick, Democrats Can Win Back Rural America, But First They Need to Understand What Bled
It Dry, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018, 4:22 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
sarahmiller1/democrats-win-rural-america-but-what-broke-it [https://perma.cc/3DYT-7N3U].
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inequality should be transient, with labor and capital moving
seamlessly across the country to reach an equilibrium over time. For
much of the mid-twentieth century, the data seemed to confirm this
theory as different parts of the country converged economically. But in
the last generation, the trend has been toward geographic divergence
and increased inequality, pushing scholars to point to agglomeration
and other theories to explain this dynamic. We discuss the conventional
economic theory, the recent history of geographic convergence and
inequality, and the many negative consequences of geographic
inequality—economic, social, political, and national security—in
Part I.
In Part II, we make the case that regulatory policy choices helped
drive the era of geographic convergence and that deregulation has
exacerbated geographic inequality. Transportation regulation, in
sectors like railroads, airlines, trucking, and intercity buses,
contributed to geographic convergence and equality through a
combination of service obligations and pricing that incorporated crosssubsidies to keep rates to far-flung places affordable. Communications
infrastructure—particularly in the “Ma Bell” era of AT&T’s
monopoly—was designed in a similar way. Deregulation (or, in the
case of communications infrastructure, the failure to apply New Deal–
style economic regulation to new technologies) undermined these
systems, with predictable, though too often unrecognized, effects.
Trade policymaking also once gave geographic considerations a central
role. For generations, the constitutional design of trade policymaking
considered local effects through the messy process of Congress
determining tariff rates for products. With the rise of presidential
authority over trade policy during the twentieth century, this
Some have noted that various areas of deregulation might be a cause, but offer less by way of
regulatory policy solutions. See, e.g., Clara Hendrickson, Why Democrats Don’t Have a Plan to
Save ‘Left-Behind’ America, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2019), https://politi.co/33Y9WQa [https://
perma.cc/ZNB9-CXV5]; see also CLARA HENDRICKSON, MARK MURO & WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, COUNTERING THE GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT: STRATEGIES FOR LEFT-BEHIND
PLACES (2018) [hereinafter HENDRICKSON ET AL., GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT], https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018.11_Report_Countering-geography-ofdiscontent_Hendrickson-Muro-Galston.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DN8-5E9W]; Richard Florida,
The Growing Inequality Between America’s Superstar Cities, and the Rest, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(Nov. 19, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/11/worsening-inequality-urbanrural-major-cities/576175 [https://perma.cc/HAH3-K4PD] (noting that “public policies like
deregulation and lax antitrust enforcement have contributed to the growing gaps between
places”). We seek to offer a scholarly account of these phenomena through exploring regulatory
impacts in greater depth and detail than journalistic accounts can, while, at the same time, uniting
the literatures across zoning and regulatory policy.
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mechanism lost its bite, and the geographic impacts of liberalized
international trade no longer receive meaningful consideration in the
trade policymaking process. Finally, antitrust laws and
anticonsolidation laws once helped keep many industries fragmented,
distributing wealth and power throughout the country. With the rise of
the consumer welfare standard in antitrust came the current era of
corporate consolidation—and with it, the hollowing out of many parts
of the country.
Part III considers possible responses to the problem of geographic
inequality. We first argue against the dominant approaches to the
problems of geographic mobility and inequality. Liberals of a
libertarian persuasion (sometimes called “liberaltarians”) suggest that
it is possible to help people who are in left-behind places through
policies that enable them to move to other, more economically vibrant,
geographies. The central liberaltarian policy is to deregulate zoning
rules and promote urban development. Although we embrace the call
for greater density in many places, we observe in Part III.A that these
policies do not address—nor are they intended to address—geographic
inequality per se, and there are reasons to believe these policies would
make geographic inequality worse. In particular, commentators in this
vein rarely mention that their proposals would have significant political
consequences that would continue to make government less
representative. They also do not sufficiently grapple with the fact that
their approach will likely exacerbate the economic and social problems
facing people and communities left behind, particularly racial
minorities and people with lower education levels and incomes. In
addition, on its own terms, zoning liberalization has a variety of
downsides that are undervalued. Notably, diminished public land-use
regulation may cause homeowners to adopt private regulation in the
form of suburban homeowners’ associations—regulations that can
have problematic implications for racial and economic fairness.
The emerging alternative to the liberaltarian response, from the
center, is to offer a package of place-based policies, which we examine
in Part III.B.19 While these move closer to addressing geographic
inequality, many of their leading proponents focus primarily on tax
policy and offer no account of how deregulatory policies have
contributed to the problem. Oddly, some even go so far as to suggest
further deregulation as a solution. Even those in this camp who do
19. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57
UCLA L. REV. 983, 985–94 (2010) (describing the history of place-based housing policy).
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consider deregulation as part of the cause are conspicuously silent on
regulatory reforms that could revive left-behind communities. We also
briefly discuss industrial policy, an approach that seems far more
promising than the centrist approach to place-based policies.
Our argument in Part III is emphatically not that zoning reforms
or tax policies should never be adopted. There are significant
opportunities to improve municipal land-use controls and to increase
density in many places. However, zoning and tax policy reforms have
significant and underappreciated costs and limitations that must be
taken into account. At the same time, federal regulatory policy has
been shockingly absent from the discussion despite its role in creating
the problem.
Part IV thus offers a number of suggestions for how federal
regulatory policy could address the problems of geographic inequality.
First, we reconsider deregulation in the transportation and
communications sectors and suggest a partial revival of the Progressive
Era and New Deal regulatory approaches, which consciously
accounted for geography. An alternative is direct public provision of
these goods and services through a public option. We also discuss how
a revival of anticonsolidation policies—most specifically, an approach
to antitrust that goes beyond consumer welfare—could help alleviate
geographic inequality. Second, we suggest that regulatory agencies
assess the geographic impacts of their decisions. In trade policy, this
would take the form of an assessment of the geographic impact that a
potential trade agreement would have (to accompany existing sectoral
assessments). More broadly, the president could issue an executive
order—or Congress could pass a law—requiring that agencies consider
the geographic impacts of their actions, including during notice-andcomment rulemaking. These changes would also bring collateral
consequences for oversight and mitigation efforts.
A couple of caveats are worth noting. First, throughout this
Article, we distinguish between a few different kinds of geographic
inequality. One is the gap between superstar cities, places like San
Francisco and New York, and mid-sized cities like St. Louis or
Memphis.20 The second is the gap between cities and rural areas, and
in particular, the economic and social erosion in rural areas.21 A third
is the gap between neighborhoods within cities. All three kinds of
geographic inequality have emerged as serious topics of conversation
20. See supra note 1.
21. See discussion infra Part I(B)(1).
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in recent years. Generally speaking, the regulatory forces we describe
operate only at the first two levels, albeit to differing degrees, and our
focus is primarily on the first. For purposes of this Article, then, we are
less concerned with inequality between neighborhoods or between
urban centers and their suburbs; sub-regional, inter-local inequality
implicates different dynamics, which we address in passing when
relevant.
Second, we acknowledge and embrace the inevitability of
economic changes over time. The geography of opportunity has never
been static, nor should it be. But though the particular geographic
configuration of opportunity might change over time, policymakers
should realize that these shifts are not automatic or inevitable. They
have been—and will continue to be—shaped by an array of legal and
regulatory choices, and those choices have feedback effects on
economics, politics, and society. The tenor and substance of the debate
over solutions have been far too narrow and overly focused on
deregulatory land use and place-based tax policies. The responses to
geographic inequality should consider the full range of the ways that
law and policy caused and can remedy this problem.
I. THE GEOGRAPHIC INEQUALITY PROBLEM
In this Part, we discuss the problem of geographic inequality.
Despite conventional economic theory positing that geographic
inequality will work itself out through the operation of market forces,
geographic inequality has decreased and then again increased over the
last century. After discussing the changing geography of inequality, we
outline its associated—and significant—economic, social, and political
downsides. This Part thus sets the stage for considering legal and policy
responses to the problem of geographic inequality.
A. The Fall and Rise of Geographic Inequality
Under conventional neoclassical economic theory, regional
inequality should be a “transitory phenomenon.”22 Labor will move to
higher-wage regions, but capital will move to less expensive places,

22. See, e.g., Yehua Dennis Wei, Spatiality of Regional Inequality, 61 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY
1, 2 (2015) (describing the conventional account of neoclassical convergence theories); see also
Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65, 90–91
(1956) (modeling a system in which labor supply responds to wage differentials).
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reducing regional inequality.23 Economic success in a place tends to
attract workers seeking employment but also leads to higher land
values and congestion costs. As the cost of locating in successful places
increases, businesses and industry will—on the margin—favor
relocating to take advantage of lower costs elsewhere. Simultaneously,
unemployed workers will leave places that are struggling economically
and that do not have enough jobs. Not only will those workers satisfy
labor demands elsewhere, their departure from struggling places will
improve unemployment rates in the places they leave behind—because
there are fewer workers—which will put upward pressure on wages.
Thriving places attract workers from struggling ones while
simultaneously pushing capital out into new areas as congestion costs
increase. This elegant theory therefore predicts a trend toward regional
economic convergence.
For a long time, regional inequality in the United States appeared
to be on the decline, conforming to this neoclassical model.24 Indeed,
from at least the 1930s to the early 1980s, poorer places outperformed
wealthier ones, creating convergence instead of divergence in regional
economic performance.25 For example, in 1940, Mississippians earned
27 percent of what Massachusetts residents made.26 By 1979, as
convergence in regions worked to reduce inequality, they made 70

23. Wei, supra note 22, at 2 (“[W]hile labor tends to move to more developed regions with
higher wages, capital tends to move to labor-intensive and more profitable sectors in less
developed regions. This condition eventually equalizes wages and the price of capital and reduces
regional income differentials.”).
24. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Convergence, 100 J. POL. ECON. 223,
224 (1992) (finding convergence as poorer regions outperformed richer regions).
25. See, e.g., id. at 245 (“Our empirical results document the existence of convergence in the
sense that economies tend to grow faster in per capita terms when they are further below the steadystate position . . . . Over long samples, poor states tend to grow faster in per capita terms than rich
states . . . .”); Ryan Nunn, Jana Parsons & Jay Shambaugh, The Geography of Prosperity, in PLACEBASED POLICIES FOR SHARED ECONOMIC GROWTH 11, 16 (Jay Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn eds.,
2018) [hereinafter PLACE-BASED POLICIES], https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/ES_THP_
PBP_book_20190425.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD6T-DE3N] (charting convergence trends starting in
1929).
26. Compare Per Capita Personal Income in Mississippi (MSPCPI), FED. RSRV. BANK ST.
LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSPCPI [https://perma.cc/4FG9-PBZE] (last updated
Sept. 24, 2020) (recording $212 per capita personal income in 1940), with Per Capita Personal
Income in Massachusetts (MAPCPI), FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/MAPCPI [https://perma.cc/DZ7A-TKMK] (last updated Sept. 24, 2020) (recording $793
per capita of personal income in 1940).
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percent of their East Coast counterparts’ earnings.27 In the 1960s,
during the period of convergence, the twenty-five richest metropolitan
areas included many that would seem surprising today, such as
“Rockford, Illinois; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Des
Moines, Iowa; and Cleveland, Ohio.”28 Movement of both capital and
labor between regions meant that the gap between the richest and
poorest regions consistently declined over time.29
That has changed. Cities with high concentrations of high-tech and
other skilled workers, in particular, have far outperformed the rest of
the country. For example, in 1980, the per capita income in
Washington, D.C., was 29 percent higher than for the country as a
whole.30 In 2013, it was 68 percent higher.31 San Francisco shows a
similar trend, with per capita income rising from 50 percent above the
national average to 88 percent above over the same period.32 Real GDP
per worker has also diverged by region. In 1980, GDP per worker in
coastal states and in the “eastern . . . and the western heartland” were
clustered together, but since then, the coastal states have pulled away.33
Another measure of this rising inequality is real estate values.
According to Professor Richard Florida, out of the eleven thousand zip
codes in America for which real estate data is readily available, only
160 have median home values over $1 million and 80 percent of those

27. Compare Per Capita Personal Income in Mississippi (MSPCPI), supra note 26 (recording
$6,633 per capita personal income in 1979), with Per Capita Personal Income in Massachusetts
(MAPCPI), supra note 26 (recording $9,481 per capita personal income in 1979).
28. See Longman, Bloom and Bust, supra note 18.
29. Cf. Benjamin Austin, Edward Glaeser & Lawrence Summers, Jobs for the Heartland:
Place-Based Policies in 21st-Century America, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring
2018, at 151, 156 (noting that regional inequality has historically been tolerated in the United
States due to the consistent corrective flow of labor to rich areas and the flow of capital to lowwage areas).
30. Longman, Bloom and Bust, supra note 18.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See Austin et al., supra note 29, at 170. Growth by region has also differed. See ECON.
INNOVATION GRP., FROM GREAT RECESSION TO GREAT RESHUFFLING: CHARTING A
DECADE OF CHANGE ACROSS AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 7 (2018) [hereinafter DISTRESSED
C OMMUNITIES I NDEX ], https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018-DCI-1-Column_
101318_WEBV5.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WES-QHAK] (“Utah, however, stood out for both
having the highest share of any state’s population living in a prosperous zip code . . . .
Louisiana, New Mexico, and West Virginia . . . joined Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi to
bring the number of states with approximately one-third or more of residents living in
distressed communities to six.”).
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were in and around New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.34 In a
particularly striking visualization, Florida shows how many houses one
could buy in different markets for the median price of a SoHo
apartment in New York City: twenty in Nashville, thirty in Cleveland,
and thirty-eight in Memphis.35
In the face of rising spatial inequality, economists have pointed to
economic forces that the neoclassical model ignored: agglomeration
and globalization. The neoclassical model anticipates that congestion
and higher land prices will eventually encourage capital to relocate to
less expensive places. Agglomeration, however, creates an important
countervailing force. Colocating businesses can lead to important
synergies and other benefits.36 Silicon Valley’s specialization in
technology is the most obvious example, but others—like fashion or
banking in New York and health care in Boston—readily come to
mind. The concentration of skilled workers in these places means that
companies have a ready labor supply. Moreover, workers have options,
allowing them to maximize the value of their skills. Importantly, in the
current economy, the benefits of agglomeration appear to be much
stronger for skilled than for unskilled jobs.37 As a result, places with a
skilled workforce—like New York or San Francisco—become stickier
for capital investments. In other words, it is much more difficult for
businesses and industries that rely on skilled labor to relocate
elsewhere to take advantage of lower costs. Economies with a large
percentage of highly skilled jobs therefore become more resistant to
the traditional convergence theory because capital does not relocate as
easily.

34. Florida, supra note 1.
35. Id.
36. See generally EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011) (describing synergies
and other benefits); MORETTI, supra note 12 (same); Vicki Been, City NIMBYS, 33 J. LAND USE
& ENV’T L. 217, 229–30 (2018) (describing agglomeration literature).
37. See, e.g., Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the
U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 78 (2017) (“Through most of the twentieth century, the
returns net of housing costs to migrating from a low-income place to a high-income place were
similar for low- and high-skill workers. . . . For these low-skill workers, rising house prices have
eroded the gains from migration.”). This was not always the case. The agglomeration benefits of
automobile manufacturing in Detroit appeared to generate benefits that were more widely shared
for a significant part of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Michael
Storper, Housing, Urban Growth and Inequalities: The Limits to Deregulation and Upzoning in
Reducing Economic and Spatial Inequality, 57 URB. STUD. 223, 230 (2019) (describing
agglomeration in the manufacturing sector prior to de-agglomeration in the 1970s).
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A second explanation for why convergence has not continued
apace is globalization.38 Due to the globalization of supply chains,
convergence now occurs internationally more than intranationally.
Where capital investments do not require a skilled workforce, they will
tend to locate in the developing world instead of the American
heartland, which is still relatively expensive compared to places like the
Philippines or Mexico.39 That may produce some measure of global
convergence, but it does little to address geographic inequality at the
national level.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, some commentators have
observed that accelerated adoption of videoconferencing and workfrom-home policies might counter the agglomeration trend and
facilitate convergence.40 If people can work from home effectively, they
need not live in superstar cities. They could move to suburbs, exurbs,
or even rural areas anywhere in the country. Though it is too early to
tell whether the pandemic will catalyze a sustained movement toward
remote work that is sufficient to counteract the forces of
agglomeration, the extent to which this potential can be realized may
itself likely depend upon regulatory choices, as we describe below.
B. Why Geographic Inequality Matters
Why is geographic inequality important? From an abstract
perspective, it is not obvious why it matters whether economic activity
is increasingly clustered in a few areas. But there are a number of
drawbacks to geographic inequality, particularly in an economic,
social, and political system whose—at least recent—baseline was
relative convergence and equality. Widening geographic inequality
comes with economic costs to individuals, communities, and the
country. It brings a variety of social consequences—most notably in
personal and public health—related to the breakdown of communities
that are left behind. It poses serious challenges for maintaining a

38. See, e.g., Wei, supra note 22, at 3–5 (discussing globalization’s impact on regional
inequality); HENDRICKSON ET AL., GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT, supra note 18, at 4 (identifying
globalization as a cause of slowing convergence).
39. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., CHARTING INTERNATIONAL LABOR
COMPARISONS 31 (2011), https://www.bls.gov/fls/chartbook/chartbook2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZH3Y-BGJK] (comparing the labor costs for manufacturing across a range of countries).
40. Sam Lessin, The Long-Term Implications of Extended Work from Home, INFORMATION
(Apr. 30, 2020, 10:01 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/the-long-term-implicationsof-extended-work-from-home [https://perma.cc/JA2D-UUSQ].
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representative government under our constitutional system. And it
places the country at greater risk in the event of wars, emergencies, or
crises.
1. Socioeconomic Consequences. Spatial inequality, and the
increasing inaccessibility of thriving places to unskilled workers, has
serious social and economic consequences across a variety of
dimensions—from job availability to personal health. One recent
comprehensive study calculates what it labels a “Vitality Index” for
different counties.41 Based on a combination of median household
income, poverty rate, life expectancy, prime-age employment-topopulation ratio, housing vacancy, and the unemployment rate, the
measure is intended to provide a kind of longitudinal snapshot of the
“economic and social well-being in a county.”42 Using data going back
to 1980, the study finds that: “On critical measures such as median
household income, poverty, unemployment rates, and life expectancy,
there exists a yawning gap between the best- and worst-performing
communities.”43 Moreover, in the aggregate across the United States,
“recent years have seen no convergence between poorer and richer
counties.”44
A Brookings Institute report finds that “unemployment rates are
twice as high in the worst-performing counties.”45 In the recovery from
the Great Recession of 2007, new business formation has also been
concentrated in relatively few places. According to one study, the top
quintile of zip codes has had more gains than the bottom 80 percent
combined.46 The spatial mismatch between workers and jobs,

41. See Nunn et al., supra note 25, at 13.
42. Id. at 14.
43. Roger C. Altman & Robert E. Rubin, Foreword, in PLACE-BASED POLICIES, supra note
25, at 1.
44. Nunn et al., supra note 25, at 18. The report also notes that “it is newsworthy that
struggling places have made unusually little headway in catching up with prospering places over
the past few decades.” Id. at 16.
45. Id. at 12.
46. See DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES INDEX, supra note 33, at 16–17. As the Economic
Innovation Group emphasized in their 2018 Report:
To underscore the geographic unevenness of new business formation over the
recovery, consider that the country itself contained only 52,800 more business
establishments in 2016 than it did in 2007, the product of the most dismal period of net
business formation on record. Five counties alone surpassed that, with a combined
55,500 more businesses in 2016 than before the recession: Los Angeles, CA; Brooklyn,
NY; Harris, TX (Houston); Queens, NY; and Miami-Dade, FL. Outside of those five

SITARAMAN IN EIC READ (DO NOT DELETE)

1778

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/15/2021 7:58 PM

[Vol. 70:1763

according to one recent study, has reduced GDP by $1.3 trillion, or
over $8,000 per worker.47 Other studies pin the economic cost of the
misallocation of labor to 2 percent of GDP.48
Geographic inequality is also tied to racial inequality. Compared
to the broader population, as Professors Bradley Hardy, Trevon
Logan, and John Parman note, “Black households are far more likely
to live in the South or in urban areas in the Midwest.”49 The geographic
distribution of the Black population also remains linked to the preCivil War distribution of the Black population.50 This geographic
distribution has important consequences. First, because many racist
policies—from slavery to Jim Crow and beyond—had a geographic
nexus and significant economic consequences, geographic inequality
and racial inequality have long been connected. Moreover, the fact that
the Black population is disproportionately concentrated in specific
geographies means that economic shocks to these regions will have a
disproportionate impact on the Black population. Researchers have
thus observed that the maps of the Black population, poverty, and
intergenerational economic mobility overlap to a troubling degree.51
In principle, a spatial mismatch between workers and jobs can be
remedied in two ways, which are not mutually exclusive: move workers
to where the jobs are or move jobs to where the workers are. The
liberaltarian consensus champions regulatory changes—in particular,
loosening of land-use regulations—that would facilitate the former.52
counties, the country still contained fewer active business establishments in 2016 than
it did in 2007.
Id. at 18.
47. See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation,
11 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1, 26 & n.28 (2019) (“[C]hanging the housing supply
regulation only in New York, San Jose, and San Francisco to that in the median US City . . . . The
net effect is that US GDP in 2009 would be 8.9% higher under this counterfactual . . . .”); see also
Urban Land: Space and the City, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.com/leaders/
2015/04/04/space-and-the-city [https://perma.cc/2W82-8SFR] (“Lifting all the barriers to urban
growth in America could raise the country’s GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about $1
trillion-2 trillion.”).
48. See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply,
32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 25 (2018); see also Been, supra note 36, at 230–31 (summarizing studies).
49. Bradley L. Hardy, Trevon D. Logan & John Parman, The Historical Role of Race and
Policy for Regional Inequality, in PLACE-BASED POLICIES, supra note 25, at 43–44.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 45.
52. See, e.g., HENDRICKSON ET AL., GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT, supra note 18, at 28
(“Policies that relax zoning restrictions will enable the construction of new housing units and bring
down housing costs.”); Christopher Serkin, A Case for Zoning, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 749, 770
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As we discuss in more detail below, these policies run the risk of
exacerbating problems in left-behind places.
Classical theory predicts that wages in struggling areas will rise as
workers migrate to booming areas.53 However, the composition of
those workers matters for regional prosperity. Thriving places are not
equally open to everyone. A disproportionate number of highly skilled
workers move to thriving places, which results in a “brain drain” from
struggling places. According to a recent report of the Joint Economic
Committee:
[H]ighly-educated adults flowing to dynamic states with major
metropolitan areas are, to a significant extent, leaving behind more
rural and post-industrial states. This geographic sorting of the nation’s
most-educated citizens may be among the factors driving economic
stagnation—and declining social capital—in certain areas of the
country.54

This effect reinforces spatial inequality, because thriving places
add to their educated workforce at the expense of struggling ones. The
segregation by education is striking. As of 2018, nearly half of all
residents in thriving places had at least a bachelor’s degree; in
struggling places that number is closer to 15 percent.55 An educated
population also produces positive externalities, whether in economic
benefits or in social capital.56
Additionally, economic stagnation and brain drain contribute to
an erosion of the tax base in struggling places. Public spending to
address problems associated with poverty also tends to be higher. This
goes beyond the typical unemployment, disability, and other social
n.129 (collecting sources). But see Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 37, at 225 (recognizing
the limits of a deregulatory agenda).
53. See discussion supra Part I.A.
54. JOINT ECON. COMM. – REPUBLICANS, 116TH CONG., LOSING OUR MINDS: BRAIN DRAIN
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2019), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/ff4c34b7c8b4-477f-887a-e95988e2a2d9/5-19-brain-drain-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QQ6-HDKX].
55. DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES INDEX, supra note 33, at 23. The index characterizes areas
as prosperous, comfortable, mid-tier, at risk, and distressed, based on a variety of factors. Id. at 3.
This data draws on the prosperous and distressed categories.
56. See Nunn et al., supra note 25, at 29 (“College attainment directly benefits graduates, but
it also generates positive spillovers that likely improve county vitality.”); Enrico Moretti, Human
Capital Externalities in Cities, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2243,
2244, 2256, 2287 (J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques-François Thisse eds., 2004) (observing that
productivity and income increases with each extra year of education, and crime decreases as high
school graduation rates go up).
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programs, many of which are at least partly funded
intergovernmentally. High-poverty cities spend much more per capita
on public functions like schools, police, and health services.57 The
combination of a smaller tax base and higher expenses can result in
dramatically higher property taxes, making it very expensive to live in
a poor place.58 Detroit, famously, has among the highest property tax
rates in the country.59
These problems are self-reinforcing, and they have serious knockon effects. As Professor Raj Chetty and his coauthors document,
intergenerational mobility varies dramatically across areas within the
United States.60 Upward mobility is very high in San Jose and San
Francisco, but very low in Milwaukee.61 Measures of social capital and
K–12 school quality, among other factors, are strongly associated with
intergenerational mobility.62 Because brain drain and tax base erosion
impair social capital and school funding, they very likely hinder upward
mobility for children who grow up in left-behind areas.63
As we have already noted, deteriorating conditions can lead to
personal and health problems for those who live in left-behind places,
including cardiovascular disease and opioid addiction. Professors Anne
Case and Angus Deaton show that “mortality and morbidity among
white non-Hispanic Americans in midlife” have been increasing in
recent years.64 They refer to drug overdoses, suicides, and alcohol57. See, e.g., Janet Rothenberg Pack, Poverty and Urban Public Expenditures, 35 URB. STUD.
1995, 1997–98, 2004 (1998); cf. Austin et al., supra note 29, at 192 (listing externalities of
joblessness).
58. See Zachary D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local Government Finance, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1828, 1831–32 (2017) (noting that, where schools are funded locally, people are
discouraged from moving from rich to poor areas because they must then assume the burden of
educating the poor).
59. See, e.g., Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy R. Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 263,
266 (2018) (“Detroit residents endure the highest property tax rates in Michigan and some of the
highest in the country.”).
60. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline & Emmanuel Saez, Where Is the Land of
Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON.
1553, 1556 (2014).
61. See id. at 1594 tbl.III.
62. See id. at 1557–58.
63. Cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Losing the War of Attrition: Mobility, Chronic Decline,
and Infrastructure, 127 YALE L.J. F. 522, 524 (2017) (“[C]hronic decline itself inhibits mobility.”).
64. Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2017, at 397, 397 [hereinafter Case & Deaton, Mortality and
Morbidity]; Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife Among White
Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15,078, 15,078 (2015).
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related liver mortality as “deaths of despair.”65 The despair that leads
to these deaths comes not only from economic challenges but from
“how people perceive meaning and satisfaction in their lives,”
including factors like “distress, and the failure of life to turn out as
expected.”66 Case and Deaton’s mapping of the geography of mortality
and morbidity suggests that superstar cities may be less affected by
these dynamics than even their surrounding areas, and these cities
show significant regional disparities when it comes to deaths of
despair.67
2. Political Challenges. Geographic inequality also raises
significant political challenges. In a representative democracy,
government should be representative of the people. But given the
design of the U.S. Constitution, increasing geographic inequality
undermines the representativeness of the federal government. One
obvious example is the Senate. The two senators from California, for
example, represent some 40 million people; their counterparts from
Wyoming, fewer than six hundred thousand.68 According to
projections based on Census data, by 2040, 50 percent of the U.S.
population will live in eight states.69 In other words, half the country
will be represented by sixteen senators, and the other half by eightyfour. The Electoral College’s design has a similar consequence.
Democrats have won the popular vote in seven of the last eight
elections, yet have only held the presidency for five out of eight
terms.70 These institutional biases filter through the Constitution’s
system of checks and balances as well. The combined effect, for
example, of presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation of
65. Case & Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity, supra note 64, at 398.
66. Id. at 433–34.
67. See id. at 409; see also ANNE CASE & ANGUS DEATON, DEATHS OF DESPAIR AND THE
FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 85–86 (2020) (noting significant regional differences in the self-reporting
of feelings of pain).
68. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and
Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019 (NST-EST2019-01), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2019),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2019/state/totals/nst-est201901.xlsx [https://perma.cc/W956-CR96].
69. Philip Bump, In About 20 Years, Half the Population Will Live in Eight States, WASH.
POST (July 12, 2018, 5:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/07/12/inabout-20-years-half-the-population-will-live-in-eight-states [https://perma.cc/9YHZ-YKYZ].
70. See Elaine Kamarck & John Hudak, How To Get Rid of The Electoral College,
BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/12/09/how-toget-rid-of-the-electoral-college [https://perma.cc/7VHN-QCWD].
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Supreme Court Justices means that five Justices in the Court’s
conservative majority were nominated by presidents who were first
elected without a majority of public support, and four were confirmed
by a Senate majority that represents a minority of the population.71 In
each of the branches of government, geographic concentration in
superstar cities will distort the representativeness of the federal
government even further.
Of course, from a purely theoretical perspective, the politics of
geographic inequality create an anomaly. The structure of the Senate,
tied to the states, overrepresents rural areas. In theory, these areas’
disproportionate representation would give them an ability to promote
policies that support rural communities. There are at least two
explanations for why the theory has not borne out and why, instead,
geographic inequality has widened despite the disproportionate power
of representatives from these areas. The first is that representatives
from rural areas got caught up in the fervor for deregulation in the
1970s and 1980s, accepted the claims of experts, and had their arms
twisted by colleagues. There is some evidence for this explanation. In
the 1970s, proponents of airline deregulation assured members of
Congress from rural states that service to smaller communities would
not deteriorate under deregulation.72 Many rural-state members of
Congress went on to vote for deregulation in 1978.73 When service to
smaller communities did in fact suffer, at least some of the lawmakers
had second thoughts. In 1985, Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee, who
had voted for deregulation, noted airline deregulation’s adverse
economic impact on his state and suggested that deregulation had
fallen out of favor “in the Congress as House members and Senators
see the air service into their [s]tates declining precipitously.”74 The next
year, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia made the point
emphatically:

71. Adam Cole, The Supreme Court Is About to Hit an Undemocratic Milestone, VOX (Sept.
28, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/21456620/supreme-court-scotus-undemocratic-milestoneminority-rule [https://perma.cc/FUF5-KASR].
72. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 329–34 (1982) (documenting
ways in which skeptical members of Congress were assured that introducing competition into the
airline industry would not result in reduced service to smaller communities).
73. See 124 CONG. REC. 10,698 (Apr. 19, 1978) (Senate); 124 CONG. REC. 30,708 (Sept. 21,
1978) (House).
74. The Economic Impact of Federal Airline Transportation Policies on East Tennessee:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 99th Cong. 44 (1985) (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser).
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[T]his is one Senator who regrets that he voted for airline
deregulation. It has penalized States like West Virginia, where many
of the airlines pulled out quickly following deregulation and the prices
zoomed into the stratosphere—doubled, tripled and, in some
instances, quadrupled. So we have poorer air service and much more
costly air service than we in West Virginia had prior to deregulation.
I admit my error; I confess my unwisdom, and I am truly sorry for
having voted for deregulation.
I would welcome the opportunity to vote for reregulation because we
people in the rural States are paying the bill . . . .
. . . I hope I shall have the opportunity to cast that [vote] one day; if
that opportunity comes, I shall do it with a vengeance . . . .
....
. . . I am afraid I shall continue to suffer until I have the opportunity
to cast that vote and, at last, ease my conscience.75

In other words, some members of Congress appear not to have fully
appreciated the consequences of the actions they were taking.
The second explanation is that elected representatives in recent
decades have done a poor job of representing the majority of their
constituents. In one study after another, political scientists show that
members of Congress are more responsive to corporate interest groups
and the wealthy than they are to ordinary voters.76 The wealthy vote
and volunteer more often, and their interest groups lobby members of
Congress more often.77 The wealthy are also more likely to serve in
elected office.78 It is no surprise, then, that political scientists have
shown that ordinary people have effectively no say over public policy
outcomes.79 On this explanation, capture explains how policies
exacerbated geographic inequality, even in spite of the skewed
75. 132 CONG. REC. 5107 (Mar. 18, 1986) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd).
76. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional
Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1455–66 (2016) (providing an overview of this literature).
77. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6–7 (2012) (“[T]he average amount of political activity rises steeply
across five quintiles of socio-economic status (SES).”).
78. See NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS
IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 4–7 (2013).
79. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 233–68 (2d ed. 2016) (showing
that policy outcomes are responsive to the wealthy, rather than ordinary people); MARTIN
GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN
AMERICA ch. 3 (2012) (same).
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structure of the Senate. Of course, these two explanations are not
mutually exclusive, and they both underscore the importance of seeing
how policy choices shape geographic inequality.
3. National Security and Resilience Concerns. When military
installations, industrial activity, or economic sectors are concentrated
in a small number of locations, an attack by a foreign adversary or a
natural disaster can have dire consequences. Geographic concentration
has therefore long been understood to be a threat to national security
and to domestic resilience. At the beginning of the Cold War,
government officials described the “need for industrial dispersal,”
given the dangers of nuclear war.80 Experts argued that cities and
industry should be dispersed widely across geography to make it harder
for an enemy to attack all of the major population centers and
industrial areas,81 and because “space” was the only “known defense
against the atomic bomb.”82 Notably, they also observed that
distributing industrial activity across the country would help lowincome places develop economically.83 This understanding was even
codified into law: the Defense Production Act included a statement of
policy—still on the books—that “the United States Government
should encourage the geographic dispersal of industrial facilities in the
United States to discourage the concentration of such productive
facilities within limited geographic areas that are vulnerable to attack
by an enemy of the United States.”84 Today, military strategists
continue to emphasize the importance of “distributing” bases and
aircraft around the country and adopting territorial fiber cables, given

80. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON THE ECON. REPORT, 82D CONG., THE NEED FOR
INDUSTRIAL DISPERSAL 1 (Comm. Print 1951).
81. See Donald & Astrid Monson, A Program for Urban Dispersal, 7 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 244, 244 (1951) (“[S]pace is our greatest protection in the danger which confronts
us.”); see also Tracy B. Augur, The Dispersal of Cities as a Defense Measure, 4 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 131, 131–32 (1948) (“Our contemporary urban structure presents an inviting target
for the machines of modern war because it is dominated by a few dozen key centers.”); Ralph E.
Lapp, Industrial Dispersion in the United States, 7 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 256, 257 (1951)
(“[O]ur industrial facilities are too strongly concentrated within about fifty prime target areas.”).
82. STAFF OF JOINT COMM., supra note 80, at 1.
83. Id. at 5.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 4502(b)(6) (2018).
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the dangers from long-range ballistic missile attacks and attacks on
communication satellites.85
Geographic dispersal also has great benefits for resilience even
outside of a full-on war. As one Congressional Research Service report
puts it, “When infrastructure is physically concentrated in a limited
geographic area it may be particularly vulnerable to geographic
hazards such as natural disasters, epidemics, and certain kinds of
terrorist attacks.”86 For example, an attack on the electrical grid or an
extreme weather event hitting New York City could wreak havoc on
the global financial system.87 Concentration in the tech sector in and
around San Francisco means that supply chains for critical technologies
are vulnerable to similar threats.88 To the extent that the future will be
defined by climate shocks, pandemics, and cyberattacks,89 geographic
dispersal may help prevent entire sectors from disruption if a single city
or region is hit by crisis.
II. DEREGULATION AND GEOGRAPHIC INEQUALITY
In this Part, we argue that deregulatory policies have been a cause
of geographic inequality. Throughout American history, but
particularly in the mid-twentieth century era of geographic
convergence, a variety of regulatory policies helped mitigate problems
of geographic inequality. Some areas, such as transportation regulation
and communications law, were designed with spatial equality in mind.
The regulatory systems for these network and infrastructure industries
used cross-subsidies to ensure geographic coverage and access to
important services. We consider them in Sections A and B. In other

85. MIRANDA PRIEBE, ALAN J. VICK, JACOB L. HEIM & MEAGAN L. SMITH, RAND CORP.,
DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS IN A CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT 9, 15, 23–24, (2019), https://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2900/RR2959/RAND_RR2959.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VTB-8ZRX].
86. PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33206, VULNERABILITY OF
CONCENTRATED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: BACKGROUND AND POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2008).
87. See, e.g., IAN GOLDIN & MIKE MARIATHASAN, THE BUTTERFLY DEFECT: HOW
GLOBALIZATION CREATES SYSTEMIC RISKS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 213 (2014) (“A
group of banks that are co-located in a major financial district, such as Wall Street or Canary
Wharf in London, poses a systemic risk if they were to be collectively affected by a major risk
event, even if no one institution alone would be systemically significant.”).
88. Geographic Concentration Risks in the High-Tech Supply Chain, SUPPLYCHAINBRAIN
(Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.supplychainbrain.com/articles/12709-geographic-concentrationrisks-in-the-high-tech-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/B77Z-FYZW].
89. Ganesh Sitaraman, A Grand Strategy of Resilience, FOR. AFFS., Sept.–Oct. 2020, at 165,
165.
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areas, like trade law and policy, the policymaking process enabled
policymakers to account for geographic impacts. Over time, as Section
C describes, reforms to those procedures left a policymaking process
that is less attentive to geographic impacts. In still other areas, like
antitrust law and corporate consolidation policies, regulatory choices
were understood to have the effect of ensuring vibrant local
communities spread across a wide geography. In Section D, we show
how this sector prioritized the macroeconomic, community, and
societal benefits of a more geographically equal society over greater
corporate efficiency.
A. Transportation Regulation
The deregulation of U.S. transportation industries in the 1970s and
1980s is widely hailed as a major triumph of Chicago School
economics.90 Federal regulations governing rates and entry in the
railroad, airline, and motor carrier—trucking and intercity bus—
industries were largely swept away in the Carter and Reagan
administrations.91 In the Chicago view, such regulations were needless
and counterproductive—poor substitutes for the disciplining power of
competition.92 Famed economist-cum-deregulator Alfred Kahn fought
tirelessly to introduce competition into the U.S transportation
industries in pursuit of marginal cost pricing.93 Under standard
economic theory, marginal cost pricing is consistent with efficient
resource allocation.94
In long-distance transportation industries, marginal cost pricing
means higher prices for more remote locations relative to more densely
populated areas—almost by definition. Transportation providers can

90. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 222–23, 293–99 (1984) (“Even
in 1970, few people realized that time and circumstance were now on the side of the Chicagoans.
But over the next dozen years, the Chicago school came to exercise great influence on public
policy in America and on regulatory policy in particular.”).
91. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & DAVID E.M. SAPPINGTON,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 628–29 (surface transportation), 643–44 (airlines)
(5th ed. 2018).
92. See MCCRAW, supra note 90, at 223 (listing the following as arguments that appealed to
Chicagoans: “that regulation and competition are often at odds; that government officials often
misunderstand the economic consequences of their decisions; and that market incentives are
usually preferable to command and control regulations”).
93. E.g., ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 63–86 (1988); MCCRAW, supra note 90, at 224, 270–71, 293–99.
94. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 311–13 (7th ed. 2015).
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exploit greater economies of scale along high-volume routes, resulting
in lower unit cost structures on these routes. By contrast, in low-density
areas that generate lower overall demand for transportation services,
cost structures (and hence prices) are higher—if, indeed, service can be
sustained at all by unregulated private providers. Consequently,
marginal cost pricing in long-distance transportation services
reinforces the agglomeration of economic activity, because those
services are a key input into many types of investment-supported
activities. For example, under marginal cost pricing, businesses located
in more populous areas benefit from lower transportation costs in
shipping goods to distant markets relative to their peers in less dense
areas.95
Key aspects of federal transportation regulation—prior to its
evisceration—had the purpose and effect of reducing or eliminating
such pricing and service differentials. The basic design mechanism was
internal cross-subsidization: using profits from high-volume routes to
subsidize service elsewhere.96 For such cross-subsidies to work, the law
had to restrict entry into these industries in order to prevent “cream
skimming” entry along lower-cost, high-volume routes.97 With entry
restriction in place, prices on these high-volume routes could be held
above marginal cost, resulting in profits that could be redeployed—
under regulatory supervision—to reduce prices on other routes.
Such cross-subsidies were a key feature of U.S. federal railroad,
motor carrier, and airline regulation for much of the twentieth century.
In 1906, Congress empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission
(“ICC”) to regulate railroad rates.98 Congress augmented these powers
in 1920 by giving the ICC control over entry into and exit from rail
service.99 The ICC used these powers to cross-subsidize rail service in
more remote areas, resulting in prices below cost in those areas.100
95. Also, less dense places are not as able to sustain multiple competing carriers, making
monopoly or oligopoly pricing more prevalent.
96. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 531 (4th ed. 2005).
97. See id. at 533.
98. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906).
99. Transportation Act, 1920 (Esch-Cummins Act), ch. 91, sec. 402, § 1, 41 Stat. 456, 477–78.
100. See THEODORE E. KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 25 (1983)
(“[C]arriers were often required to continue unprofitable services . . . .”); GEORGE W. HILTON,
THE TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1958: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 136 (1969) (describing rate
averaging in passenger rail service). The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, a milestone in the
history of the U.S. administrative state, prohibited railroads from charging higher rates for shorter
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Motor carrier regulation followed a similar model. With the enactment
of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the trucking and intercity bus
industries came under the ICC’s regulatory purview.101 The ICC
regulated rates and entry in the motor carrier industry and required
motor carriers to serve off-line points.102 If a carrier failed to meet these
service obligations, the ICC would suspend its authority to operate.103
To implement cross-subsidies, the ICC awarded profitable routes to
offset losses on money-losing routes.104 As for air travel, the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 applied the same model to the nascent airline
industry.105 The Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) regulated entry and
rates, and it implemented an “equal fares for equal miles” rate
structure.106 Regulators allocated routes with a view toward offsetting
unprofitable routes with profitable ones.107
In a remarkable 1971 article analyzing this mode of regulation,
then-Professor Richard Posner noted that “it would appear that the
primary effect of such a program is . . . to extend the service to classes
of customers and geographical areas that might not be served in a free
market.”108 He went on to suggest that this regulatory model may be
motivated in part by “concern with geographic concentration of
population and economic activity. A program of internal subsidies that
denies the cost advantages of proximity and density, as is often the
case, encourages greater geographic dispersion.”109

distances than for longer ones over the same line, “the shorter being included within the longer
distance.” Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 4, 24 Stat. 379, 380. Though not involving
cross-subsidies, this provision was designed to benefit intermediate points—typically smaller
communities. See Comment, The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Long-and-Short-Haul
Problem, 45 YALE L.J. 1426, 1428 (1936) (“On behalf of the intermediate points, which usually
are smaller communities, the argument is made that long-and-short-haul discriminations give
undue preference to the larger terminal points and tend to stifle economic activity at other
points.”).
101. Motor Carrier Act, 1935, ch. 498, § 204, 49 Stat. 543, 546.
102. See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
DEREGULATION 28–29 (1989) [hereinafter DEMPSEY, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF DEREGULATION].
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, §§ 401, 404(b), 52 Stat. 973, 987–91, 993.
106. BREYER, supra note 72, at 212.
107. Id. at 213.
108. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 40 (1971).
109. Id.
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To the extent that this regulatory model promotes geographic
dispersion, its repeal should do the opposite—promote geographic
concentration. Congress in 1958 relaxed exit restrictions in passenger,
as opposed to freight, rail service, allowing railways greater discretion
in discontinuing service along unprofitable routes.110 The legislation
also gave the ICC the power to overturn decisions of state public utility
commissions (“PUCs”), if those commissions blocked rail companies’
attempts to discontinue service.111 In other words, Congress allowed
the ICC to accelerate the elimination of passenger service over the
objections of state PUCs. A flurry of additional legislation between
1973 and 1980 replicated for freight rail service what had already been
done on the passenger side—namely, it made exit much easier.112
Deregulation prompted railways to discontinue service along many
routes and to altogether abandon many rail lines.113 The results were
devastating for many rural and smaller communities whose economic
well-being depended on rail service.114
Deregulation of the motor carrier industry followed the same
script and had the same effects. Congress enacted legislation in 1980
that sharply curtailed the ICC’s authority to regulate entry, exit, and
rates in the trucking industry.115 Although continued state regulation
of trucking blunted the impact of federal deregulation, there is some
evidence that some small communities lost service as a result and that
pricing differentials between small and large communities widened.116
110. See Transportation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-625, sec. 5, § 13a(1), 72 Stat. 568, 571.
111. Id. at sec. 5, § 13a(2), 72 Stat. at 572.
112. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985;
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31;
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895; FRANK J. DOOLEY & WILLIAM E.
THOMS, RAILROAD LAW A DECADE AFTER DEREGULATION 18, 45–46 (1994) (describing how
the legislation “eased the abandonment process”).
113. See DOOLEY & THOMS, supra note 112, at 46 (“Under ICC review, the number of
passenger trains fell by 60 percent between 1958 and 1970 . . . .”); id. at 18 (“From 1970 to 1988,
the ICC granted certificates of abandonment for 39,993 miles of road . . . .”).
114. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small
Communities, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 451 (1987) [hereinafter Dempsey, Dark Side of
Deregulation] (“The impact of a rail abandonment upon a community was, and is, devastating,
for when the line is gone, it is usually gone forever. Many of the ghost towns of the West owe their
demise to the decision of the railroads to terminate service.”).
115. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
116. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Interstate Trucking: The Collision of Textbook Theory and
Empirical Reality, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 185, 229–36 (1992); James P. Rakowski, Marketing Economies
and the Results of Trucking Deregulation in the Less-Than-Truckload Sector, TRANSP. J., Spring
1988, at 11, 11, 21.
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As for the intercity bus industry, the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of
1982 practically eliminated regulatory restrictions on service
discontinuance.117 As it had done with railroads, Congress gave the ICC
the authority to overrule state PUCs if they denied bus companies’
applications to discontinue service.118 In the run-up to bus deregulation,
the president of Greyhound grimly noted that “the rural areas are
going to have to suffer.”119 He was right. After deregulation, small
towns lost intercity bus service by the thousands.120 A former senator
concluded in 1984 that “[b]us deregulation has had a devastating
impact on rural America.”121 Even Alfred Kahn would later have
second thoughts when it came to intercity busing: “I’m not sure I would
ever have deregulated the buses because the bus is a lifeline of many
small communities for people just to get to the doctor or to the Social
Security office.”122
Airline deregulation mirrored that of railways and motor carriers.
Under the leadership of Kahn—whom President Jimmy Carter
installed as its chairman in 1977—the CAB started deregulating airline
entry and rates through administrative action.123 The coup de grâce was
administered the following year with the enactment of the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, which put the CAB itself on a path to
dissolution.124 The end of economic regulation of airlines, combined
with lax antitrust enforcement following deregulation,125 led to sharp
117. See Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 16(a), 96 Stat. 1102, 1115–
17; Dempsey, Dark Side of Deregulation, supra note 114, at 461 (“Since promulgation of the 1982
Bus Act, carrier abandonments have been little short of breathtaking . . . .”).
118. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, § 16(a), 96 Stat. at 1115–17.
119. DEMPSEY, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION, supra note
102, at 205 (quoting POL’Y & MGMT. ASSOCS., INC., INTERCITY BUS SERVICE IN SMALL
COMMUNITIES 17 (Comm. Print 1978) (reporting to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, & Transportation of the 95th Congress)).
120. DEMPSEY, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION, supra note
102, at 206.
121. Dempsey, Dark Side of Deregulation, supra note 114, at 462 (alteration in original)
(quoting William Robbins, Dependent on Buses, Midwestern Towns Fight Cuts in Service, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1986, at A14 (reporting the statements of Senator Larry Pressler)).
122. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Running on Empty: Trucking Deregulation and Economic
Theory, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 295 (1991) (quoting Testimony of Alfred Kahn Before the
California Public Utilities Commission on Cross Examination by Paul Stephen Dempsey at 6337
(Jan. 31, 1989)).
123. See 1977 C.A.B. REPORTS TO CONGRESS 1–5, 69.
124. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40, 92 Stat. 1705, 1744–47.
125. Kahn even noted that the Reagan administration needed to step up antitrust
enforcement, and worried about the creation of an oligopoly in airlines. See Alfred E. Kahn,
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service reductions and price increases for flights to and from many
small and midsize cities.126 Such cities also offered fewer direct flights
as the industry shifted rapidly from a point-to-point to a hub-and-spoke
organizational model.127 Flights in and out of inland cities like Memphis
and Cincinnati, are now far more expensive per mile than those out of
San Francisco or New York.128 Such disparities were forbidden prior to
deregulation. Because travel to and from such inland cities has become
much more expensive and inconvenient, corporate headquarters have
fled.129 These cities have also lost annual conventions and the tourism
dollars that came with them, and countless new businesses have
declined to invest, slowing economic growth and development.130
“Today,” noted one 2012 study, “such major heartland cities as
Cincinnati, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Memphis are increasingly cut off
from each other and the global economy due to drastically curtailed
airline service and monopolistic fares.”131

Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 348 (1990)
(“[T]he government clearly has neglected responsibilities of which it was never the intention of
deregulation to relieve it. These include . . . vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws . . . .”);
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Airline Deregulation Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1986, at D1
(describing Kahn’s worry about the industry moving to “an uncomfortably tight oligopoly”). As
this Article discusses below, however, antitrust was moving in the same deregulatory direction.
126. See Andrew R. Goetz & Timothy M. Vowles, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 30 Years
of US Airline Deregulation, 17 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 251, 251 (2009) (noting that deregulation
resulted in “fewer flights and higher fares to smaller places”); Phillip Longman & Lina Khan,
Terminal Sickness, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar.–Apr. 2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/
magazine/marchapril-2012/terminal-sickness [https://perma.cc/E8M3-UYGS] (discussing “lost
airline service and skyrocketing fares” in cities like Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Memphis, St. Louis,
and Minneapolis).
127. Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets Work . . . or Do They?:
Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT
HAVE WE LEARNED? 63, 88 (Nancy L. Rose ed., 2014) (describing the industry’s “almost
immediate transformation” to the hub-and-spoke model).
128. Longman, Bloom and Bust, supra note 18.
129. See id. (noting that “a city’s airline service is now an essential precondition for its success in
retaining or attracting corporate headquarters”); see also Longman & Khan, supra note 126 (discussing
companies moving headquarters and operations due to inadequate air service); Aditi Shrikant, Why
Air Service Is So Crucial for Small Cities, VOX (Nov. 12, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://www.vox.com/thegoods/2018/11/12/18080806/air-service-small-cities-crucial [https://perma.cc/KV4A-Z42P] (discussing
companies that moved headquarters for “better access to flights”).
130. Longman & Khan, supra note 126.
131. MKTS., ENTER., & RESILIENCY INITIATIVE, NEW AM. FOUND., HARD LANDING: THE
BREAKDOWN OF AMERICA’S AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF DEREGULATION 5 (2012),
https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/Hard_Landing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TRL-QRP2].
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In the freight rail and airline sectors, Congress sought to soften
deregulation’s blow to smaller communities by providing direct
subsidies for service continuance.132 Nonetheless, as described above,
small communities lost service. In the airline sector, some small cities,
like Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Columbia, Missouri, are now paying
airlines to offer occasional service.133 And federal funding for Local
Rail Freight Assistance is no longer available.134
This shift toward (paltry) direct subsidies raises a subtle but crucial
point about institutional design. Posner recognized that economic
regulation can be interpreted as a method of public finance; he
described internal cross-subsidies as a method for “delegation of minor
taxing functions to regulatory agencies.”135 But Posner did not fully
explore the ramifications of this delegation. One notable feature of
internal cross-subsidies—not shared by direct subsidies—is that they
sidestep the vagaries of annual legislative appropriations. Crosssubsidies are thus insulated to some degree from politics; infrastructure
resources that are subject to this mode of regulation become selfcontained systems. Because cross-subsidies bypass appropriations, they
are likely to be more durable than direct subsidies. Hence, “taxation
by regulation,” to use Posner’s phrase,136 is a type of commitment
device. To the extent that cross-subsidies are more durable than direct
subsidies, they will better encourage ex ante investment in
infrastructure-dependent business activities, thereby contributing to
economic growth and development in remote locales. The demise of

132. These subsidies have been provided through the Local Rail Freight Assistance Program
and the Essential Air Service Program. Congress established the Local Rail Freight Assistance
program with the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–236, § 401, 87 Stat.
985, 1010, and augmented it with the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 803, 90 Stat. 31, 130. The Airline Deregulation Act provided the “Essential
Air Service (EAS) program . . . to guarantee that small communities that were served by
certificated air carriers before airline deregulation maintain a minimal level of scheduled air
service.” Essential Air Service, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/policy/
aviation-policy/small-community-rural-air-service/essential-air-service [https://perma.cc/CEB3VPC3] (Nov. 22, 2017).
133. See Shrikant, supra note 129.
134. See Closed Grant Programs, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP.: FED. R.R. ADMIN., https://
railroads.dot.gov/grants-loans/closed-grant-programs [https://perma.cc/UZ4Q-CQ2A] (Oct. 21,
2019).
135. Posner, supra note 108, at 45.
136. Id. at 22.
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this regulatory model should therefore be considered an important
contributor to widening regional inequality.137
B. Communications Law
Transportation systems and communications systems have much
in common. Both are typically spatially expansive and characterized by
high fixed costs and low marginal costs. Both are network-type
resources that promote connectivity. Both are “infrastructural,”
meaning they are crucial inputs into productive activity, and therefore
key catalysts for business investment and economic growth and
development.138 It should not be surprising that, historically, the
regulatory structures governing these two sectors have shared
important features. Transportation and communications resources,
together with certain energy resources, are the traditional “regulated
industries” that have been subject—in the United States, anyway—to
a distinctive regulatory apparatus governing rates, entry and exit, and
service requirements.139
This special regulatory apparatus remains firmly entrenched at the
local level in the United States, via public utility regulation. Regulators
generally require electric and gas utilities to offer adequate service to
everyone residing in their franchise area, even if this means that the
utility must make money-losing investments in physical plants.140
Utilities typically are not permitted to charge higher prices to
consumers residing in sections of the franchise area that are more
costly to reach.141 This departure from marginal cost pricing is
137. The linkage between intercity transportation systems and geographic inequality is also
evident in other countries. See Michael Kimmelman, France’s Yellow Vests Reveal a Crisis of
Mobility in All Its Forms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GyFmFG [https://perma.cc/
HN2C-8Z36] (documenting the decline of regional passenger rail service in France); Ceylan
Yeginsu, ‘This Is All We Can Afford’: Shrinking Lives in the English Countryside, N.Y. TIMES
(May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/world/europe/cumbria-uk-austeritycuts.html [https://perma.cc/M6AJ-P5QR] (“As bus lines are cut and services dry up under
austerity, older people are feeling new constraints.”). See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey,
William E. Thoms & Sonja Clapp, Canadian Transport Liberalization: Planes, Trains, Trucks &
Buses Rolling Across the Great White North, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 113 (1990) (documenting parallels
between U.S. and Canadian transportation deregulation).
138. See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES xiv, 3–9 (2012).
139. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES
IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 1999) (describing regulated industries); BREYER, supra note 72 (same).
140. E.g., PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 139, at 217.
141. See id.
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understood to be a term of the “regulatory compact” governing the
utility.142 State regulators treat providers of local telephone service
similarly. Telephone companies must generally abide by uniform rate
structures within their franchise areas; harder-to-reach customers may
not be charged higher prices.143 As shown above, this basic regulatory
structure once governed U.S. transportation industries at the federal
level, on a state-spanning basis. As described below, a similar model
once applied to portions of the communications sector.
These systems were all patterned after a common prototype—the
venerable, centuries-old communications network of the U.S. postal
system. The Post Office Act of 1792144 was designed to ensure broad
geographic coverage. Legislators understood from the outset that
many postal routes would be money-losers.145 By design, thinly settled
areas in the South and West received substantial cross-subsidies from
the population centers.146 The U.S. postal system still works this way,
with internal cross-subsidies ensuring the provision of postal services
to every community, no matter how remote.147 Uniform domestic

142. See, e.g., Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 313–14, 313 n.232 (2017)
(quoting Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving State and
Local Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1619, 1628 (2014)).
143. PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2.1.1 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2011). As communications historian
Richard John has shown, price and entry regulations were the norm from the start in municipal
telephone regulation. See, e.g., Richard R. John, From Franklin to Facebook: The Civic Mandate
for Communications, in TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE 156, 164–65 (Steven Conn ed.,
2012).
144. An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads Within the United States, ch. 7, 1
Stat. 232 (1792).
145. RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM
FRANKLIN TO MORSE 49 (1995).
146. See RICHARD R. JOHN, HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THE POSTAL
MONOPOLY 21 (2008) [hereinafter, JOHN, HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE], https://
academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D87H325K [https://perma.cc/2U48-2LM2], in
POSTAL REGUL. COMM’N, REPORT ON UNIVERSAL POSTAL SERVICE AND THE POSTAL
MONOPOLY app. D (2008), https://www.prc.gov/download/report/field_report_file-1668
[https://perma.cc/T8XQ-HHME]; George L. Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in the
United States, 18 J.L. & ECON. 33, 55–56 (1975).
147. See JOHN, HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE, supra note 146, at 13; see also RICHARD
R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 22, 121–22, 379–
80 (2010) [hereinafter JOHN, NETWORK NATION]; Richard R. John, Private Enterprise, Public
Good?: Communications Deregulation as a National Political Issue, 1839–1851, in BEYOND THE
FOUNDERS: NEW APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 328, 349 (Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson & David Waldstreicher eds., 2004).
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postal pricing has been in place since 1863.148 Thus, mailing longer
distances or to more far-flung locations cannot be up-charged.149 Postal
rates, in other words, are not keyed to marginal cost. These principles
have been reaffirmed over the years by Congress150 and by the U.S.
Postal Service.151 Further, federal statutes restrict entry into competing
lines of business in order to limit cream-skimming, which would
undermine the system’s cross-subsidies.152
Congress fashioned telecommunications regulation after the
postal system. In 1910, Congress designated telegraph and telephone
companies to be “common carriers” and gave the ICC jurisdiction over
them.153 That same year, seeing the regulatory writing on the wall,
AT&T voluntarily adopted the mantra of “universal service.”154 At the
behest of state PUCs, statewide rate averaging followed soon
thereafter, thereby delivering cross-subsidies to telephone customers
in more remote regions within states.155 Universal service became
explicit federal policy with the Communications Act of 1934, which

148. U.S. POSTAL SERV., UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THE POSTAL MONOPOLY: A BRIEF
HISTORY 5 (2008), https://about.usps.com/universal-postal-service/universal-service-and-postalmonopoly-history.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE7Q-LES8].
149. See id.
150. See Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, sec. 2, § 3623(d), 84 Stat. 719, 761
(1970) (repealed 2006) (providing for continuation of uniform nationwide rates); id. at sec. 2, §
101(a), 84 Stat. at 719 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 101(a) (2018)) (“The United States Postal Service
shall be operated as a basic and fundamental service provided to the people by the Government
of the United States . . . and shall render postal services to all communities.”); id. at sec. 2, §
101(b), 84 Stat. at 719 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 101(b) (2018)) (providing that the U.S. Postal
Service “shall provide a maximum degree of effective and regular postal services to rural areas,
communities, and small towns where post offices are not self-sustaining,” and that “[n]o small
post office shall be closed solely for operating at a deficit, it being the specific intent of the
Congress that effective postal services be insured to residents of both urban and rural
communities”).
151. See U.S. POSTAL SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2007) (“[O]ur mission remains the same—
providing trusted, affordable, universal service.”); id. at 59 (defining “universal service” as
providing “uniform and reasonable rates to everyone, everywhere”). See generally PRESIDENT’S
COMM’N ON THE U.S. POSTAL SERV., EMBRACING THE FUTURE: MAKING THE TOUGH CHOICES
TO PRESERVE UNIVERSAL MAIL SERVICE (2003) (reaffirming commitment to universal service
and uniform rates).
152. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1696 (2018); 39 U.S.C. §§ 601–606 (2018).
153. See Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, sec. 7, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 544–45 (1910).
154. See JOHN, NETWORK NATION, supra note 147, at 345.
155. See Richard H.K. Vietor, AT&T and the Public Good: Regulation and Competition in
Telecommunications, 1910–1987, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 27, 35
(Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds., 1989).
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created the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).156 The
lead sentence of the Act states that its purpose is to regulate the
communications industry “so as to make available, so far as possible,
to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges.”157 The FCC soon extended regulatory
policies that had been spearheaded by state PUCs to the federal level.
Just as the CAB had required equal fares for equal miles in the airline
industry, the FCC in the 1940s imposed a policy of equal charges for
equal services, resulting in nationwide average pricing.158 Across the
nation, rural and small-town telephone users benefited. Regulation
thus promoted the build-out of landline networks to create a practically
universal system—an achievement that survived the forced break-up
of AT&T in 1984159 and subsequent deregulatory telecommunications
regulation.160
Over the past two decades, the action has shifted away from
landline telephony and toward new communications services—
specifically, cellular phone and broadband internet services. In these
areas, the New Deal–era model of infrastructure regulation—which
prioritized universal service through cross-subsidization—has not been
brought to bear.161 The results are predictable: profound regional
disparities in service quality and availability. Many rural areas in the
United States lack reliable cellular phone service, or any service at
all.162 The FCC expects to disburse “universal service” subsidies to

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064.
Id.
See Vietor, supra note 155, at 46.
See JOHN, NETWORK NATION, supra note 147, at 407–13.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56.
See JODIE GRIFFIN & HAROLD FELD, FIVE FUNDAMENTALS FOR THE PHONE
NETWORK TRANSITION, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 9 (2013), https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/
five-fundamentals-for-the-phone-network-transition [https://perma.cc/F6JG-JBQU] (noting that
the FCC has not applied universal service mandates to new networks and services and questioning
“whether we continue to believe in the same basic social contract between our society and our
communications networks”).
162. Terena Bell, How Cellular Dead Zones Hurt Rural Towns, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Mar.
17, 2017, 4:47 PM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/urbs/how-cellular-dead-zoneshurt-rural-towns [https://perma.cc/53PE-3MKD]; Matt Dunne, Rural America’s Future Is Riding
on a Cell Signal, WIRED (June 28, 2017, 6:35 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/rural-americasfuture-is-riding-on-a-cell-signal [https://perma.cc/7JH3-EGT4]; Brian Fung, ‘These Maps Are
Bogus’: US Lawmakers Tear into Telecom Execs over Spotty Rural Coverage, WASH. POST (Feb.
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promote mobile services in rural areas over the next decade, but the
impact of this program remains to be seen.163 (If comparable
approaches in the railroad and airline industries are any guide, the
effects will be modest at best.164) As for high-speed broadband, over 30
percent of rural Americans do not have access to it at home.165 When
rural consumers do have access to broadband services, it is often
expensive and low quality.166 The situation persists notwithstanding
federal government initiatives to promote rural broadband.167 Lack of
accessible, affordable broadband significantly decreases property
values.168
Communications services, like transportation services, are crucial
inputs into economic growth and development. There are good reasons
to believe that better communications infrastructure would promote
economic activity in rural communities and smaller cities. In this vein,
the experience of Chattanooga, Tennessee, is illuminating. It began
offering municipal broadband in 2010.169 By 2016, the city was offering
14, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/14/rural-cell-coveragestinks-say-us-lawmakers-they-have-had-it [https://perma.cc/NGY5-94EC].
163. See FCC, 5G Fund for Rural America, fcc.gov/5g-fund [https://perma.cc/4MPG-XP38].
The FCC established the 5G Fund in October 2020 to replace its MF-II Fund, which has been
suspended due to violations of mapping rules by major telecommunications carriers participating
in the auction. FCC, Mobility Fund Phase II (MF-II), https://www.fcc.gov/mobility-fund-phase-iimf-ii [https://perma.cc/NA8P-HJ8M] (last updated May 18, 2020).
164. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
165. See 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, 33 FCC Rcd. 1660, 1686 tbl.4 (2018); Principles to
Connect Rural America, BROADBAND CONNECTS AM., http://www.broadbandconnectsamerica.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/02/PrinciplesEditsV5_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP3H-KNF2] (“While
39 percent of rural Americans lack access to high-speed broadband, only 4 percent of urban Americans
lack access.”).
166. See Heather McDougal, I Live 50 Miles from Silicon Valley and I Can’t Get Broadband
Access, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/i-live-50-milesfrom-silicon-valley-and-i-cant-get-broadband-access [https://perma.cc/RBK6-Q2VG].
167. See generally FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN
(2010), https://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/55NH-G6P7] (Obama administration); NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.,
AMERICAN BROADBAND INITIATIVE MILESTONES REPORT (2019), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/publications/american_broadband_initiative_milestones_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JPN7-XJWG] (Trump administration).
168. See generally Steven Deller & Brian Whitacre, Broadband’s Relationship to Rural
Housing Values, 98 PAPERS REG’L SCI. 2135, 2136 (2019) (“As the Internet becomes pervasive in
American life, rural households without broadband access might find the value of their property
negatively impacted.”).
169. Dave Flessner, Chattanooga Boosts Citywide Broadband Capacity to 10 Gigabits,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/
story/2015/oct/15/chattanooga-becomes-first-10-gigabit-city-world/330691 [https://perma.cc/TFP6-
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its residents ultra-high-speed 1 gigabit internet service for $70 a month
and blazing 10 gigabit service for $300 a month.170 Small businesses and
startups have flourished as a result.171 According to the mayor who
ushered in the program, municipal broadband “has restored our luster
and given us a new lever to pull that has tied us to the next century,
rather than the steam and smoke of the old century.”172
When it comes to mobile phone and broadband internet services,
the federal regulatory model that prevailed in U.S. transportation and
communications industries during the mid-twentieth century points to
a path not taken. Cross-subsidies within regulated infrastructural
systems can be powerful tools to promote geographic dispersion of
business investment and economic activity. By contrast, current
approaches serve to reinforce the economics of agglomeration and feed
into growing geographic inequality.
C. The Political Economy of Trade Policy
By the turn of the twenty-first century, economists had come to a
four-part consensus about liberalizing trade regulations.173 First, they
believed that liberalizing trade was not a major factor contributing to
declining employment levels in the United States or to rising economic
inequality.174 Second, workers displaced by increased global trade
could easily relocate to other areas within the United States.175 Third,
to the extent trade harmed American workers, it would harm all lowwage workers, not simply those whose jobs were disproportionally tied

DPJ5]; see also Zaid Jilani, Killing Net Neutrality Has Brought On a New Call for Public Broadband,
INTERCEPT (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/12/15/fcc-net-neutrality-publicbroadband-seattle [https://perma.cc/9FDS-2YK3].
170. Flessner, supra note 169.
171. See Cameron Albert-Deitch, How Gigabit Internet Is Turning Smaller U.S. Cities into
Tech Hot Spots, INC. (Feb. 2020), https://www.inc.com/magazine/202002/cameron-albertdeitch/superfast-internet-broadband-gigabit-chattanooga-smaller-city.html [https://perma.cc/
8TAU-E7RE]; P.E. Moskowitz, Chattanooga Was a Typical Postindustrial City. Then It Began
Offering Municipal Broadband., NATION (June 3, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/
archive/chattanooga-was-a-typical-post-industrial-city-then-it-began-offering-municipalbroadband [https://perma.cc/27M9-BXFW].
172. Jilani, supra note 169.
173. See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock: Learning
from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205, 207–08
(2016) [hereinafter Autor et al., The China Shock].
174. Id. at 207.
175. Id. at 208.
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to trade.176 And finally, to the extent greater international trade had an
effect on wages, the impacts would be national, not focused in
particular locales.177 Over the past decade, economists have
increasingly questioned these assumptions—and research now shows
that the policy choice to liberalize trade regulations has had significant
geographic impacts.
Perhaps the most attention has gone to a series of important
papers by Professors David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson.
Autor and his coauthors demonstrate that in areas that were affected
by import-competition from China, unemployment increased, labor
force participation decreased, wages declined, and people increased
their reliance on disability and other welfare benefits.178 Notably, wages
and employment were impacted throughout these communities, rather
than just in the manufacturing sector.179 They also show that the
communities that were hit by this “China Shock,” which accelerated
after that country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001,
had a hard time bouncing back.180 Wages and unemployment rates
remained depressed “for at least a full decade after the China trade
shock.”181 And these workers had lower lifetime income and rotated
through jobs more often.182
In other words, trade liberalization exacerbated geographic
inequality. This is not surprising. Economic sectors are not distributed
evenly across geography, particularly in a large country like the United
States.183 As a result, trade-based changes in a particular sector will
disproportionately impact certain geographic areas. Further, hard-hit
areas will intuitively have a difficult time bouncing back from traderelated shocks. It is challenging for workers to retrain or relocate, and

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2125 (2013).
179. Id. at 2147–48.
180. See Autor et al., The China Shock, supra note 173, at 213, 225 (“[T]he labor-market
impacts of trade shocks are likely to be amplified by slow and incomplete adjustment[s] . . . .”).
181. Id. at 205.
182. Id.
183. See generally SUSAN HELPER, TIMOTHY KRUEGER & HOWARD WIAL, BROOKINGS,
LOCATING AMERICAN MANUFACTURING: TRENDS IN THE GEOGRAPHY OF PRODUCTION (2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0509_locating_american_manufacturing_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/836V-VGVJ] (“American manufacturing is highly differentiated
geographically.”).
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there are powerful family-related and emotional reasons people stay in
their communities. There can also be no assurance that new capital will
replace departing employment. If anything, agglomeration theory
might suggest the opposite; businesses might prefer to locate in areas
that are largely successful and can draw talent.
Trade’s impact on particular geographies and sectors has
disproportionately affected specific communities, which can also
contribute to racial inequality. “Some areas with disproportionately
high Black populations—including northern Mississippi, western
Tennessee, central regions of Virginia, and cities such as Gary, Indiana,
and Youngstown, Ohio,” Daniella Zessoules observes, “have suffered
from job displacement due to . . . [the] ‘China shock.’”184 Black workers
are also disproportionately represented in motor vehicle and tire
manufacturing, comprising 16.7 and 17.4 percent of manufacturing
workers in those sectors, compared to 12.3 percent of manufacturing
workers overall.185 Thus, when these geographically concentrated
sectors get hit by offshoring, the impacts widen both geographic
inequality and racial inequality.
And yet, though choices about trade policy undoubtedly affect
geographic inequality, in recent years the trade policymaking process
has been relatively inattentive to the geographic inequality problem. It
was not always this way. The constitutional underpinnings of trade
policymaking create a process that once took geographic consequences
extremely seriously. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” “lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” raise revenue, and make any laws
“necessary and proper” for implementing the powers of the
government.186 Individually and together, these powers give
Congress—rather than the president—the leading authority over trade
issues. This distribution of constitutional powers is significant because
Congress reflects the geographic diversity of the country far better than
does the presidency.187 Members of Congress represent specific
constituencies, with their own distinct economic interests and needs,
184. DANIELLA ZESSOULES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, TRADE AND RACE 3 (2019) https://
cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2019/07/17120916/Trade-and-Race.pdf [https://perma.cc/
57T2-NA56].
185. Id. at 2.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
187. See Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 583, 632–38 (2019).
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and because members of the House are elected with great frequency,
they are tied more closely to the preferences of their constituents than
is the president.188 Indeed, James Madison thought that the local
expertise and attachments of Congress made it the appropriate locus
for trade policymaking: “How can foreign trade be properly regulated
by uniform laws,” he asked in Federalist 53, “without some
acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the
regulations of the different States?”189
As a result of this initial constitutional design, Congress was the
dominant force setting tariff rates across sectors for the first century of
American history.190 Local politics, protectionism, and horse-trading
were central to the story during this era.191 But while commentators
today almost uniformly criticize this approach,192 the constitutional
design meant that policymaking accounted for the geographic
consequences of trade policy.193 This is partly why the ferocious tariff
battles of the nineteenth century had cleavages along geographic fault
lines, between the North, the South, and the West.194 People knew that
tariff policies would affect each sector differently and that this would
have significant impacts on local economies.195 These divides then
played out in Congress, in the form of battles over tariff rates for
different sectors.
Over time, and particularly in the mid-twentieth century,
Congress increasingly delegated trade policymaking authority to the
president.196 The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act gave the
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 330–33 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 348 (James Madison) (“The representatives of each State will
not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their
respective districts, but will probably in all cases have been members . . . of the State legislature,
where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled . . . .”).
189. THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, supra note 188, at 333 (James Madison).
190. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE 68–330 (2017) (describing this
history).
191. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 187, at 593–94.
192. See, e.g., 1 CHARAN DEVEREAUX, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL D. WATKINS,
CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE NEGOTIATION 188 (2006) (“The president, whose constituency is
the entire nation, is likely in the best position . . . to represent the overall national interest in open
trade.”), quoted in Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 187, at 632 (describing this view as a “common
trope”).
193. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 187, at 632–38.
194. See IRWIN, supra note 190, at 125–75.
195. See id.
196. For a detailed history, see Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 187, at 599–600.
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president considerable power to lower tariff rates in the midst of the
Great Depression, and in the post-World War II era, Congress
repeatedly refused to endorse the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade while crafting policies that would rein in the delegated tariff
powers.197 With the Trade Act of 1974, however, this general approach
changed. Congress granted the president power to negotiate “nontariff
barriers”—regulatory and other policies that have an impact on
trade—and adopted a “fast-track” process that functionally meant that
Congress abandoned the field of trade policymaking.198 Under this
process, Congress takes an up-or-down, all-or-nothing vote on a trade
agreement.199 Fast-track includes no opportunity for renegotiating the
agreement, addressing specific geographic concerns, or making other
reforms to address dislocations.200 It also undermines the negotiating
posture of representatives whose constituents are on the losing side of
trade agreements. Once the agreement is passed, members of Congress
from districts that will be made worse off lose their leverage to gain
concessions or win redistributive policies.201
At the same time, the shift to trade policymaking in the executive
branch was not accompanied by a replacement for the process-based
approach to taking account of geographic considerations. The U.S.
International Trade Commission (“ITC”), for example, publishes
studies on the sectoral impact of trade agreements.202 These studies can
run into the hundreds of pages, and they offer granular predictions on
the impacts of a proposed agreement on a specific sector.203 The ITC is
also mandated by law to assess the impact on workers, employment,
profits, and other economic factors from a national perspective.204 But
it is not required to consider the geographic impact that provisions in a

197. Id. at 601–06.
198. See Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 VAND. L. REV. 151, 172 (2020) (citing
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 102, 88 Stat. 1978, 1982–84 (1975) (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2112) (2018)).
199. See id. (citing Trade Act of 1974, § 151, 88 Stat. at 2001–04 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2191) (2018)).
200. See id.
201. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 187, at 635–36.
202. See Commission Publications Library, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/
commission_publications_library [https://perma.cc/45X9-JJFF] (archiving publications).
203. See, e.g., U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INVESTIGATION NO. TPA-105-001, TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: LIKELY IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC INDUSTRY
SECTORS (2016), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4607.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD7S-QGD7].
204. Trade Act of 1974 § 131(b)–(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2151(b)–(d) (2018); 19 U.S.C. § 4204(c).
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trade agreement might have. It is a policy choice not to consider this
factor—and not to address the consequences of these agreements.
The argument here is not that trade policy should go back to the
nineteenth-century approach of the House of Representatives logrolling and micromanaging tariff rates. There are still powerful
arguments based on expertise and managerial efficiency for having the
executive branch take the lead in negotiating trade agreements.
Rather, our argument is that trade has consequences for geographic
inequality and that these are a function of legal and policy choices.
Trade policymaking once took account of geographic consequences
because Congress played the leading role in setting tariff rates. With
the shift to greater presidential control in the 1970s, Congress did not
incorporate this factor into the trade policymaking process, rendering
it less able to account for the geographic consequences of trade
liberalization.
D. Antitrust and Corporate Consolidation
In recent years, scholars and commentators across the political
spectrum have come to accept that America has a concentration
problem—in sector after sector of the economy, a small number of
firms has a disproportionate share of market power.205 As a result,
there has been increased interest in more aggressive antitrust
regulations and enforcement.206 Commentators have argued that lax
antitrust enforcement has been a problem for new business formation,
wages, and inequality207—but there has been far less attention to its
205. See, e.g., William A. Galston & Clara Hendrickson, A Policy at Peace with Itself: Antitrust
Remedies for Our Concentrated, Uncompetitive Economy, BROOKINGS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/a-policy-at-peace-with-itself-antitrust-remedies-for-our-concentrateduncompetitive-economy [https://perma.cc/J4E7-ZMDC] (noting market concentration); Too Much of
a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/03/26/too-muchof-a-good-thing [https://perma.cc/73B4-4U4U] (same). See generally ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN
WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 168–
204 (2018) (same); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (2018) (same).
206. For proposals, see GANESH SITARAMAN, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, TAKING
ANTITRUST AWAY FROM THE COURTS 3 (2018), https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/Taking-Antitrust-Away-from-the-Courts-Report-092018-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8WW8-C3KF] and MARSHALL STEINBAUM & MAURICE E. STUCKE, ROOSEVELT INST., THE
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD: A NEW STANDARD FOR ANTITRUST 29 (2018), https://
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Effective-Competition-Standard-201809.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LP3-EY3F].
207. See, e.g., IAN HATHAWAY & ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS, WHAT’S DRIVING THE
DECLINE IN THE FIRM FORMATION RATE? A PARTIAL EXPLANATION 9 (2014), https://
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impact on geographic inequality.208 As with the other areas of
regulatory policy, the shift toward a more permissive antitrust
environment—and more broadly, deregulatory policies that facilitated
mergers and corporate concentration and consolidation—has been one
of the sources of geographic inequality. When markets are not
concentrated, firms will be smaller in size and spread across the
country, distributing wealth, employment, and a variety of important
local economic and civic benefits in the process. Historically, a number
of legal regimes from anti-chain store laws, to banking regulations, to
antitrust law itself, promoted geographic dispersal in the economy.
In the 1920s, chain stores gained increased market share over
American retail, with companies like A&P and J.C. Penney spreading
in scope and dominance across communities.209 The motley anti-chain
store coalition was concerned about the decline of local shopkeepers
and the economic, social, and political impact it would have on local
communities.210 “Chain groceries, chain dry-goods stores, chain
clothing stores,” then-Senator and future Supreme Court Justice Hugo
Black said in 1930, “here today and merged tomorrow—grow in size
and power.”211 He continued,
We are rapidly becoming a nation of a few business masters and many
clerks and servants. The local man and merchant is passing and his
community loses his contribution to local affairs as an independent
thinker and executive. A few of these useful citizens, thus supplanted,
become clerks of the great chain machines, at inadequate salaries,

www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/driving_decline_firm_formation_rate_hathaway_
litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6BR-SDFE]; Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and
Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 238
(2017); José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24147, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/files/
working_papers/w24147/w24147.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HUB-3HT6].
208. For examples of the research on the effects of lax antitrust enforcement on geographic
inequality, see Longman & Khan, supra note 126; HENDRICKSON ET AL., GEOGRAPHY OF
DISCONTENT, supra note 18, at 11; Kenneth Rogoff, What About Rochester?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/downsides-of-rise-ofmegacities-by-kenneth-rogoff-2019-08 [https://perma.cc/Z3C3-PWPK] (arguing in favor of
“better enforcement of anti-trust policies” as a strategy to make “struggling cities more attractive,
both to enhance growth and to relieve population pressure in the megacities”).
209. Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the
Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1020 (2005).
210. Id. at 1013, 1028.
211. 72 CONG. REC. 1239 (1930) (statement of Sen. Hugo Black), quoted in Schragger, supra
note 209, at 1025.
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while many enter the growing ranks of the unemployed. A wild craze
for efficiency in production, sale and distribution has swept over the
land, increasing the number of unemployed, building up a caste
system, dangerous to any government.212

By the time of Black’s remarks, the movement had grown in
power and soon found surprising success at both the state and federal
levels. Indiana passed a tax on chain stores in 1929, and after the
Supreme Court upheld it,213 other states followed. Between 1931 and
1937, twenty-six more states passed anti-chain store laws.214 Congress
also took action to reform the antitrust laws in response to pressure
from the anti-chain store movement. Congress directed the FTC to
conduct investigations, with reports trickling out over a six-year
period.215 Hearings began in 1935, ultimately leading to the RobinsonPatman Act of 1936, which revised the Clayton Antitrust Act.216 The
purpose, advocates argued, was to ensure that manufacturers and
suppliers couldn’t give unfair discounts to chain stores that were
unavailable to independent retailers.217 This would, they argued,
preserve local businesses from the spread of chains with distant
headquarters and owners.218
That same year, Congress also passed the Miller-Tydings Act,219
which was designed to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.220 In that case, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit resale price
maintenance—the practice of a manufacturer setting a price floor,
below which retailers could not sell.221 Manufacturers were concerned
with brand value; small independent retailers were concerned about
being undercut on price.222 Large chains could offer loss-leaders and

212. Id. at 1239–40.
213. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 542–43 (1931).
214. Schragger, supra note 209, at 1014.
215. Id. at 1061.
216. Id. at 1062 (citing Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b) (2018)).
217. Id. at 1063.
218. Id.
219. Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 673, 693–94 (1937) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)).
220. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
221. Id. at 405.
222. Schragger, supra note 209, at 1064.
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predatory prices in ways that the small retailers could not.223 Over the
course of the 1930s, forty-two states passed laws allowing resale price
maintenance.224 Miller-Tydings was an attempt to ensure that the
federal antitrust laws would not be a barrier to regulating what
advocates said was unfair competition against small retailers.225 It
would be forty years before Congress repealed Miller-Tydings in 1975,
ostensibly to help consumers.226
As a second example, consider the geographic consequences of
the structure of banking regulations in the middle of the twentieth
century. In 1864, the National Bank Act gave rise to a system in which
banks were chartered at either the state or federal level, and federally
chartered banks were not allowed to have branches.227 After states
started allowing state-chartered banks to create intrastate branches in
the early twentieth century, Congress passed the 1927 McFadden Act
and subsequent amendments, permitting federally chartered banks to
engage in intra-state branch banking on equal terms as states offered
their banks.228 In this era, banking was geographically constrained—in
some cases, to an extreme degree because of state rules regarding
branch banking. The Illinois Constitution of 1870, for example, banned
branch banking intrastate, and this prohibition held for a century.229
The state began to water down the limitation in 1976, and it was not
until 1993 that Illinois permitted unlimited branch banking.230 When
banks began to circumvent branching rules in the mid-twentieth
century by creating bank holding companies, Congress intervened and
largely closed this loophole with the Bank Holding Company Act of

223. Id.
224. Id. at 1065.
225. Id.
226. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801, 801. The
law also repealed the McGuire Act, an amendment to Miller-Tydings passed in 1952 as a response
to a Supreme Court case narrowing the application of the original law. Id. § 3.
227. See National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 102 (1864) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2018)) (requiring that the “usual business” of each federally
chartered bank “be transacted at an office or banking house located in the place specified in its
organization certificate”).
228. See McFadden Act, ch. 191, sec. 7, § 5155, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228–29 (1927) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2018)).
229. Illinois Bank Branching History, ILL. DEP’T FIN. & PRO. REGUL., https://www.idfpr.com/
Banks/cbt/STATS/BR-HIST.ASP [https://perma.cc/WHH4-YQME].
230. Id.
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1956.231 It was not until the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act, which deregulated this geographically
restrictive system, that limitations on branch banking came to an end.232
In the regulated system, rather than a few “too big to fail”
nationwide banks, there were many small- and medium-sized banks
throughout the country. The existence of smaller financial institutions
meant a variety of benefits for local communities. Consider a
hypothetical Bank of Middle Tennessee (“BMT”) headquartered in
Nashville, Tennessee. BMT would have a president and senior
managers who get paid very well for their region. But after
deregulation, if Chase Bank can buy up BMT and consolidate all
executive functions at its New York City headquarters, those jobs go
away. What is left are lower-paid, less-skilled branch managers and
tellers. The consequences of this simple headquarters consolidation—
usually justified as creating economic efficiencies—are significant for a
local community and for national trends on inequality. The president
of the local bank might have been rich by community standards, but
the CEO of Chase takes home far more than a local banker would ever
have seen. The profits of BMT shift from the greater Nashville area to
Chase Bank’s shareholders.233 Economic spillovers dry up—higherincome local executives no longer contribute to local consumption and
the local tax base because those jobs are gone. The business’s local
contractors and consultants no longer have as much work. Small
businesses in the area find it harder to get loans.234 The region also loses
civic and community leaders and the philanthropy of those individuals

231. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135
(repealed 1994). For a thorough account of the origins and subsequent development of the Bank
Holding Company Act, see Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank:
Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 117 (2011) (“As originally enacted, the [Bank Holding Company Act]
was designed primarily to restrict geographic expansion of large banking groups and to prevent
excessive concentration in the commercial banking industry.”).
232. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, sec. 101, § 3(d), 108 Stat. 2338, 2349–53 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)
(2018)).
233. In addition to the exodus of high-wage jobs, “managers are conditioned and pressured
to run the business to advance the interests of their wealthiest constituents: shareholders.” Khan
& Vaheesan, supra note 207, at 238, 242–44.
234. Indeed, studies during and after the era of bank consolidation found that as banks grow
in size and complexity—and expand in branches, including interstate—they reduce their smallbusiness lending. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good to Be True? The Unfulfilled Promises Behind
Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 36–41 (1995).
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and the local bank itself.235 And the worst thing is that each of these
dynamics reinforces the others, creating a downward spiral in which
other companies do not want to locate in the area because it no longer
has a vibrant economy with a diversity of skill-based jobs.
These local effects were, at one point, an important motivating
factor for American antitrust laws and anti-consolidation laws. In the
antitrust context, for example, the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendments
to § 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act—also known as the Anti-Merger
Act—were partly motivated by these local concerns.236 During the
legislative debates on the bill, Representative Joseph Bryson of South
Carolina noted that “under local management the legitimate profits of
industry tend to remain at home and promote the well-being of the
hometown. In contrast, under the new outside ownership, the profits
are siphoned off to distant areas . . . .”237 He also commented that
“[u]nder local ownership, there are strong social and civic ties that bind
the community together.”238 Celler-Kefauver thus placed restrictions
on corporate acquisitions.239
In this earlier era, Supreme Court Justices from a range of
ideological viewpoints also recognized the value of local ownership. In
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,240 for example, Justice William
O. Douglas argued that “the acquisition of local business units by outof-state companies” could lead “local employment . . . to suffer, local
payrolls . . . to drop off, and responsible entrepreneurs in counties and
States [to be] replaced by clerks.”241 Justice Lewis Powell offered, in a
1982 concurrence, that when corporations merge and consolidate
235. For an extensive discussion of these downsides, see generally Richard M. Brunell, The
Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring “Local Control” as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REV.
149 (2006). Studies have shown that corporate philanthropic contributions tend to go to local
charities, see, for example, Katherine Maddox McElroy & John J. Siegfried, The Community
Influence on Corporate Contributions, 14 PUB. FIN. Q. 394, 404–07 (1986).
236. Brunell, supra note 235, at 185–86.
237. Id. at 189 (quoting 95 CONG. REC. 11,495 (1949) (statement of Rep. Joseph Bryson)). Brunell
offers a variety of other portions of the legislative debate to make clear the local motivations for this
provision. See id. at 186–89. The “buy local” movement is a consumer-based response to precisely these
dynamics. See, e.g., Lizzy Alfs, Buy Local Movement: Why It Really Does Make a Difference, ANN
ARBOR NEWS (Nov. 24, 2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/business-review/buy-localmovement-why-it-really-does-make-a-difference [https://perma.cc/CG3C-TGWV].
238. Brunell, supra note 235, at 189 (quoting 95 CONG. REC. 11,495).
239. See Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (2018)).
240. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
241. Id. at 543 (Douglas, J., concurring in part).
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headquarters, “[M]anagement personnel—many of whom have
provided community leadership—may move to the new corporate
headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educational
life—both in terms of leadership and financial support—also tend to
diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.”242
Despite the widespread understanding of the link between
antitrust, consolidation, and geographic inequality, starting in the
1970s, the Chicago School in antitrust law and economics pushed aside
local considerations—among other things—in favor of efficiency as the
sole goal of the antitrust laws. Then-Professor Robert Bork argued in
The Antitrust Paradox that the very idea of local control as a factor in
antitrust analysis was part of an “ancient and disreputable ‘social
purpose’ theory of antitrust.”243 As antitrust law became focused solely
on consumer welfare, as measured by prices and output, the impact of
mergers on geographic inequality fell by the wayside, even though a
simple analysis that measured the total costs and total benefits of a
merger would include geographic considerations. After all, as antitrust
expert Richard Brunell notes, “The costs of the negative externalities
borne by a community losing a corporate headquarters through merger
may well exceed the benefits of a merger, including any benefits that
accrue to the headquarters city of the acquiring firm and any gains in
operating efficiency.”244 But the Chicago School’s new approach to
antitrust excluded even these purely economic factors.
Indeed, antitrust law today considers geography only in the
narrowest possible way. Prior to a court assessing whether a business
practice has anticompetitive effects, it must determine the relevant
market. Defining the market involves both determining what products
are competitive with the product at issue and identifying the
geographic market in which competition occurs. Over the last forty
years, the antitrust agencies and the courts have taken different
economic approaches to defining the geographic market,245 often with

242. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.* (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
243. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 203 (1978).
244. Brunell, supra note 235, at 158.
245. See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & Vandy M. Howell, Geographic Market Definition in
the Merger Guidelines: A Retrospective Analysis, 53 REV. IND. ORG. 453 (2018) (chronicling the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission’s development of the geographic
market definition on merger enforcement); Maryan M. Chirayath, Oh Canada!: Antitrust
Geographic Market Definition and the Reimportation of Prescription Drugs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1027

SITARAMAN IN EIC READ (DO NOT DELETE)

1810

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/15/2021 7:58 PM

[Vol. 70:1763

criticism from distinguished practitioners and jurists that they are
unworkable and unreliable.246 But beyond the technical challenges of
determining the geographic market, it is worth underscoring that the
market definition exercise does not consider the geographic effects of
mergers or anticompetitive policies—only the geographic scope in
which the policies will be considered. From a geographic inequality
perspective, this misses the problem: corporate consolidation and
mergers can create geographic inequality, and antitrust law can help
redress it.
III. CONSENSUS POLICY RESPONSES AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
So what can be done about geographic inequality? Distinguished
commentators, including Nobel Prize–winning economist Paul
Krugman, express skepticism that anything can be done. “There are
powerful forces behind the . . . decline of rural America,” Krugman
says, “and the truth is that nobody knows how to reverse those
forces.”247 Indeed, Krugman has gone so far as to state that “[r]egional
divergence is an invisible-hand phenomenon, caused by market forces
rather than any deliberate policy.”248 Other scholars and policymakers,
however, offer solutions to address the problem. In this Part, we first
consider two of the most prominent policy suggestions: zoning reforms
and place-based economic policies. We argue that the elite
liberaltarian consensus on zoning deregulation cannot address the full
scope of the problem of geographic inequality, will make some aspects
of the problem worse, and may even have perverse consequences in
some areas. We then argue that place-based economic policies offered
by center-left and center-right economists are also unlikely to address

(2005) (discussing different theoretical approaches to the geographic market definition in
antitrust law).
246. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 825
(1987) (“[T]he measurement of market power, which requires the definition of relevant product
and geographic markets, is the most elusive and unreliable aspect of antitrust enforcement.”); see
also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s invitation to consider the existence of ‘market power’ . . . invites
lengthy time-consuming argument among competing experts, as they seek to apply abstract,
highly technical, criteria to often ill-defined markets.”).
247. Paul Krugman, Opinion, Getting Real About Rural America, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2TKMDbJ [https://perma.cc/AY66-UCJU].
248. Paul Krugman, Regional Economics: Understanding the Third Great Transition, CUNY
GRADUATE CTR. 8 (Sept. 2019), https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/LISCenter/
pkrugman/REGIONAL-ECONOMICS-3rd-transition.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPY6-D6TW].
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the full scope of the problem, and that their technical solutions have a
variety of downsides. Both of these approaches notably fail to fully
account for regulatory policies that impact geographic inequality.
Recent calls for a revival of industrial policy fare better, as they have
the potential to jumpstart economies outside of superstar cities.
A. Zoning and Deregulation
1. The Liberaltarian Consensus. Geographic inequality has led to
a nearly constant drumbeat for land-use reform.249 It is quickly
becoming conventional wisdom among elite policymakers that the
inaccessibility of superstar cities because of out-of-control housing
prices is a critical public policy challenge.250 The problem, on this
framing, is not geographic inequality per se, but rather a lack of
mobility resulting largely—though not completely—from high housing
costs in thriving places.251 Implicitly, in other words, the solution is
giving everyone the opportunity to participate in the economies that
are doing well.
In a competitive housing market, this problem should not exist. If
workers are willing to pay some marginally higher price to relocate to
successful high-wage places, then developers should increase housing
supply to satisfy that demand and, in the process, keep housing costs
low. Traditionally, local economic booms have been accompanied by
significant housing development.252 In today’s superstar cities, that has
not happened, and housing starts have actually declined year over
249. See, e.g., Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Start to Question an American Ideal: A House
With a Yard on Every Lot, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (June 18, 2019), https://nyti.ms/37QtS8Z [https://
perma.cc/283G-K9L3]; Sarah Holder & Kriston Capps, The Push for Denser Zoning Is Here to Stay,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (May 21, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/05/residentialzoning-affordable-housing-upzoning-real-estate/588310 [https://perma.cc/RSU6-N6JG]; Benjamin
Schneider, Liberal America’s Single-Family Hypocrisy, NATION (May 8, 2019), https://
www.thenation.com/article/zoning-housing-homeless-segregation [https://perma.cc/P3YW-SUD2];
Haisten Willis, As Cities Rethink Single-Family Zoning, Traditional Ideas of the American Dream Are
Challenged, WASH. POST. (June 27, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/ascities-rethink-single-family-zoning-traditional-ideas-of-the-american-dream-are-challenged/2019/06/
25/8312a512-4ca3-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html [https://perma.cc/MH6Q-SKE3].
250. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A.
Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence From Greater Boston, 65
J. URB. ECON. 265, 267 (2009) (discussing costs of zoning).
251. See, e.g., David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127
YALE L.J. 78, 137 (2017).
252. Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2017), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations [https://perma.cc/2YL7-CR96].
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year.253 In an influential paper, economists Peter Ganong and Daniel
Shoag blame zoning, arguing that the widespread proliferation of
restrictive zoning and land-use regulations have prevented developers
from meeting demand.254 The result is underproduction of housing
relative to demand, increased housing costs, and reduced access to
thriving places. When supply is constrained, developers will not
compete away the value to housing consumers of living in a successful
area. In economic terms, land-use regulations restricting housing
supply mean that the marginal economic benefits of living in a place
are capitalized into housing costs.255
The prescription to this formulation of the problem is clear—
increase housing supply in successful cities and decrease other
regulatory barriers to entry.256 For this reason, land-use regulations
have become a leading target to create more mobility and more
opportunities for workers to move to thriving places. This attack on
restrictive zoning crosses political boundaries and has become a
rallying cry on both the right and the left.257

253. See id. (“Between 1880 and 1910, bustling Chicago’s population grew by an average of
56,000 each year. Today, San Francisco is one of the great capitals of the information age, yet
from 1980 to 2010, that city’s population grew by only 4200 people per year.”).
254. See Ganong & Shoag, supra note 37, at 86–88; Moira O’Neill, Giulia Gualco-Nelson &
Eric Biber, Developing Policy From the Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to
Inform California’s Housing Policy Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 1, 72–74 (2019) (attributing
principal supply constraints in select California cities to zoning as opposed to state environmental
review).
255. See Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place:
Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1678 (2013).
Elsewhere, one of us provides the following illustration:
[I]f living near mass transit allows residents to avoid owning a car, this may save them
upwards of $7500 per year. Housing advocates have long argued for more transitoriented development precisely on grounds that such housing will be more affordable,
all things considered, because people living near mass transit will have lower
transportation costs. However, if that financial benefit is fully capitalized into local
property values, so that buyers or renters will have to pay an additional $7500 per year
(or more) to live near mass transit, then those cost savings disappear.
Christopher Serkin, Capitalization and Exclusionary Zoning, in MEASURING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF REAL ESTATE REGULATION 15, 16 (Ronit Levine-Schnur ed. 2020) (citation
omitted).
256. See Serkin, supra note 52, at 769 n.128 (collecting sources calling for relaxation of zoning
regulations).
257. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Opinion, The Emerging Cross-Ideological Consensus on Zoning, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5, 2015, 4:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/12/05/the-emerging-cross-ideological-consensus-on-zoning [https://perma.cc/WRS5MJ5W]; see also Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause, 42 VT. L.
REV. 1, 13 (2017) (describing the shrinking political divide).
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Conservative opposition to zoning and land-use regulation is
neither surprising nor new. It follows decades of broad conservative
opposition to land-use regulations and is consistent with skepticism
about regulatory interventions into private market transactions.258
What is considerably more surprising is the extent to which the
progressive left is increasingly on board with loosening zoning. The left
has taken aim at “Not in My Back Yard” (“NIMBY”) opposition to
new development in order to increase housing supply and to promote
affordability, especially in the urban core. They label exclusionary
zoning “opportunity hoarding” and challenge density restrictions and
antigrowth measures of all sorts.259 In a recent comprehensive
treatment, Professor Vicki Been observes that NIMBYism is no longer
the exclusive domain of exclusionary suburbs but has invaded the

258. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 263–82 (1985) (“[Under l]and use regulation . . . [i]ll-defined rights replace
well-defined ones, and transaction cost barriers are likely to exceed the gains that otherwise are
obtainable from any shift in land use or ownership. Another negative-sum game.”); Molly S.
McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic
Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 605–06 (1996) (describing conservative reliance on property to
oppose regulations); John D. Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 351,
365–67 (1997) (characterizing the conservative perspective); Serkin, supra note 257, at 2–4. See
generally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972) (arguing that zoning fails
to meet its own goals, and highlighting the nonzoning approach exemplified in Houston). Some
iconoclastic conservative and libertarian voices have embraced regulatory reforms in the service
of affordability. Professors Roderick Hills and David Schleicher, alone and together, have
advocated for significantly liberalizing zoning laws, precisely to unlock development potential.
See Schleicher, supra note 251, at 84–86; Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing
the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 81, 119–20 (2011) (proposing fair-share
requirements to unlock development potential); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher,
Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 129–33 (2015) (proposing tools for loosening
zoning through planning). Professor Ilya Somin has also called for increased judicial oversight of
local zoning through the Takings Clause. See Ilya Somin, Expanding Housing and Job
Opportunities by Cutting Back on Zoning, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 20, 2017,
3:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/20/expandinghousing-and-job-opportunities-by-cutting-back-on-zoning [https://perma.cc/V4F2-ZPUL].
259. See, e.g., RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS 102–106 (2017) (“For the upper
middle class, zoning and wealth reinforce each other in a virtuous cycle.”); Olatunde C.A.
Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1647, 1655
(2016) (quoting Thomas Sugrue, Diversity, Toleration, and Space in Metropolitan America, SOC.
SCI. RSCH. COUNCIL: CITIES PAPERS (July 23, 2014), http://citiespapers.ssrc.org/diversitytoleration-and-space-in-metropolitan-america [https://perma.cc/B8GV-VUQ3]). For an 8-bit
cartoon demonstration of the phenomenon, see Carrie Engel, Play the Dream Hoarders Game,
BROOKINGS (July 13, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/13/playthe-dream-hoarders-game [https://perma.cc/SW86-G4QZ].
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urban core, and she argues forcefully against it.260 It is quickly
becoming liberal orthodoxy, at least among academics and elite
policymakers, to promote density by removing zoning restrictions.261
The attack on the density limits in traditional zoning has spread
beyond academics and has taken root in policy circles,262 as well as in
the press.263 It has also translated recently into some real changes in
municipal zoning on the ground. The most striking examples to date
are the efforts by Minneapolis and by the entire state of Oregon to
eliminate single-family residential zones.264 This is an extraordinary
move. It builds upon the “Yes in My Backyard” (“YIMBY”)
movement in California, which has supported various reforms of
density requirements throughout the state.265 A California bill, SB 50,
all but eliminates single-family zoning near mass transit and job
centers.266 San Francisco recently eliminated parking requirements for

260. See Been, supra note 36, at 217–18, 229–30 (exploring increasing NIMBYism in cities and
its resulting effect on urban housing costs).
261. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 63 (“Reducing the cost of housing in thriving regions,
especially by removing density controls, is a critical step towards correcting the jobs-housing
imbalance and allowing newcomers to these regions to capture and create economic growth.”);
see also Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing
Supply and Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25, 27–28 (2019) (reviewing economic
literature and advocating for increasing housing supply).
262. See Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Barriers to Shared Growth:
The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents 1 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120_barriers_shared_growth_
land_use_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VVX-JR4B] (“[E]xcessive or
unnecessary land use or zoning regulations have consequences that go beyond the housing market
to impede mobility and thus contribute to rising inequality and declining productivity growth.”).
263. See, e.g., Florida, supra note 1; Paul Krugman, Opinion, Inequality and the City, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1Hzlkp8 [https://perma.cc/XS3R-CBMK] (“Yes, [zoning]
is an issue on which you don’t have to be a conservative to believe that we have too much
regulation.”); Matthew Yglesias, You Can’t Talk Housing Costs Without Talking About Zoning,
SLATE (Dec. 10, 2013, 8:50 AM), https://slate.com/business/2013/12/housing-costs-it-s-the-zoningstupid.html [https://perma.cc/L2TB-7C4B].
264. See, e.g., Henry Grabar, Minneapolis Confronts Its History of Housing Segregation,
SLATE (Dec. 7, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://slate.com/business/2018/12/minneapolis-single-familyzoning-housing-racism.html [https://perma.cc/2N6P-GHMQ] (describing zoning change); Laurel
Wamsley, Oregon Legislature Votes to Essentially Ban Single-Family Zoning, NPR (July 1, 2019,
7:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737798440/oregon-legislature-votes-to-essentially-bansingle-family-zoning [https://perma.cc/TH4R-BGME].
265. See Benjamin Schneider, YIMBYs Defeated as California’s Transit Density Bill Stalls,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Apr. 18, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/
californias-transit-density-bill-stalls/558341 [https://perma.cc/LPQ5-UPBP].
266. See, e.g., Liam Dillon, California Could Bring Radical Change to Single-Family-Home
Neighborhoods, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-
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some new development, significantly increasing permissible density.267
Before that, the administration of New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio
spearheaded a zoning change to remove mandatory parking spots for
certain kinds of new development in order to increase density.268
Though these examples individually represent relatively modest
changes to a land-use regulatory landscape that continues to impose
significant development restrictions, the trend toward relaxing density
limits appears to be gaining steam.
2. Critique of the Liberaltarian Consensus. Stepping back, the
focus of these efforts to combat geographic inequality has been on
lowering barriers to enter the relatively small number of thriving and
dynamic urban centers. These include primarily limiting or eliminating
traditional density restrictions, but also dismantling occupational
licensing and other regulations that interfere with geographic
mobility.269 The fix is focused on people, not places.270 Providing more
people with access to economic success is an admirable goal, but it
essentially gives up on the notion of a more evenly distributed
geography of opportunity, writing off struggling places by making it
easier to escape from them.

single-family-zoning-changes-senate-bill-50-legislation-20190513-story.html [https://perma.cc/XY3QRHKL] (describing the efforts).
267. See Joshua Sabatini, Minimum Parking Requirements on Their Way Out in SF, S.F.
EXAMINER (Dec. 4, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/minimum-parking-requirementsway-sf [https://perma.cc/7JDS-AYW6].
268. See Zoning for Quality and Affordability, NYC PLANNING, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/
planning/plans/zqa/zoning-for-quality-and-affordability.page [https://perma.cc/Y4YX-BPUB] (last
updated June 22, 2016) (highlighting changes).
269. Other barriers include the lack of portability of benefits. See Schleicher, supra note 251,
at 127 n.220; Robert C. Ellickson, The Mediocrity of Government Subsidies to Mixed-Income
Housing Projects, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND POLICIES 418, 425–34 (Gregory K. Ingram &
Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2009) (arguing for housing vouchers instead of public housing in part
because of portability of benefits). Another target is professional licensing. See Rebecca Haw
Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 1567, 1570 (2017) (“That occupational licensing goes too far, at the expense of consumers
and entrepreneurs, has been a source of frequent and high-profile criticism from economists and
policymakers for decades.”).
270. Some people focus on both. See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in
Housing and Community Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2009)
(“Every policy that seeks to respond to the spatial concentration of poverty works through
individuals.”).
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A recent report from the Brookings Institution is a stark
example.271 The authors divide their specific prescriptions into two
sections: people-based and place-based.272 As with other liberaltarian
efforts, people-based proposals focus primarily on lowering barriers to
exit or, as they put it, “restoring more geographical mobility to the
labor market.”273 The goal is to provide economic opportunity to those
who find themselves in “left-behind places.”274 The authors call for
identifying “10 or so medium-sized metropolitan areas [that] would
compete for major federal investment and designation as a Rising Tech
Hub or federal ‘tech pole.’”275 Those ten places are then supposed to
throw off benefits for their respective regions. But this still relegates
most of the country—both mid-sized cities and rural areas—to the
unfortunate category of perennially left behind.276
Indeed, mobility-focused, people-based strategies all suffer from
a core set of problems. Fundamentally, they do not solve—but rather
exacerbate—almost all of the pernicious consequences of geographic
inequality described in Part I. Economists have shown that the
deregulation of land-use controls in New York and California would
shift people, jobs, and economic growth to superstar cities in those
states and away from the Midwest, South, and Southwest.277 The data
also show that national deregulation would have the same effect.278
Reviewing this work, Florida comments:

271. See HENDRICKSON ET AL., GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT, supra note 18, at 28 (“Policies
that relax zoning restrictions will enable the construction of new housing units and bring down
housing costs.”).
272. Id. at 26–27 (labeling sections “A place-based approach: Connect opportunity to
workers,” and “A people-based approach: Connect workers to opportunity”).
273. Id. at 27.
274. See id. at 27–29 (describing proposal).
275. Id. at 27.
276. At the very least, this goal of geographic mobility that encourages moving to a few
superstar cities is in tension with the policies seeking to support the places that are left behind.
See, e.g., Nunn et al., supra note 25, at 38 (concluding that the problem of “disconnected
economies with vastly different opportunities for economic advancement” within the United
States is compounded by “a federal system that makes very different investments in local public
goods depending on the resources of particular state and local governments”).
277. See Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Lee E. Ohanian & Edward C. Prescott, Tarnishing the Golden
and Empire States: Land-Use Restrictions and the U.S. Economic Slowdown, 93 J. MONETARY
ECON. 89, 103, 108 (2018).
278. See id. (evaluating nationwide distortions from land-use regulation and modeling how
deregulation would result in more people moving to New York and California).
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Deregulating land use would make the most productive metros and
states even more productive . . . . California and New York would be
much better off, and have many more people and a greater share of
economic output. But the gap between these few places and the rest
of the country would be even wider than it already is.279

The proposed liberaltarian solutions may make it easier for people
to leave low-performing areas, but there are limits to the number of
people a city can accommodate, even in the absence of zoning.
Regulations, after all, are not the only source of restrictions on housing
supply. There are physical limits as well. Whereas buildings can
(almost280) always grow taller, infrastructure limits impose meaningful
constraints on density.281 Cities typically develop with surplus capacity
in infrastructure like roads, water, wastewater, parks, and so forth. But
that surplus is not infinite, and density can outstrip what a city is able
to handle.282 Roads can only grow so big and are difficult to widen after
they have been built; mass transit is difficult to retrofit in a developed
city and can even be difficult to upgrade and repair.283 Most American
cities still have considerable room to grow—at least in most
neighborhoods—but there are limits to increasing supply. In the end,
there will always be people living in “left-behind” places. This means
that economic and social costs will still manifest in those areas, in
addition to the significant—and with the liberaltarian solution,
increasing—distortions to representative democracy. By framing the
problem narrowly in terms of mobility and the attendant solution of
land-use reform, the liberaltarian approach does not address the full
scope of and problems with geographic inequality.

279. Richard Florida, The Flip Side of NIMBY Zoning, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Oct. 26, 2017,
8:54 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/10/the-flip-side-of-nimby-zoning/543930 [https://
perma.cc/K9U4-7559].
280. One hard limit on building height comes from the limits of elevators and the area that
they consume in buildings. For a discussion of the relationship between elevators and building
heights, see Nate Berg, Is There a Limit to How Tall Buildings Can Get?, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(Aug. 16, 2012, 8:50 AM), https://www.citylab.com/design/2012/08/there-limit-how-tall-buildingscan-get/2963 [https://perma.cc/YNZ9-E7XF].
281. See Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 57, 66–70 (2011); A. Dan Tarlock, Toward a Revised Theory of Zoning, in LAND USE
CONTROLS ANNUAL 141, 150 n.26 (Frank S. Bangs, Jr. ed., 1972).
282. See Foster, supra note 281, at 58–61.
283. See, e.g., Adam Pearce, How 2 M.T.A. Decisions Pushed the Subway into Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/33coKeH [https://perma.cc/5HL7-3MXQ].
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In addition to exacerbating geographic inequality, the
liberaltarian approach is likely to disproportionately benefit—as well
as harm—specific groups. Unsurprisingly, not all people are likely to
move at the same rate. Data from the Federal Reserve on internal
migration show that white people are more likely to move than Black
people, those with greater educational attainment are more likely to
move than those with less, and higher-income people are more likely
to move than lower-income people.284 Disproportionate effects tied to
socioeconomic status appear in other ways as well. In opposite-sex
couples, Professor Naomi Schoenbaum argues, “mobility brings lower
levels of employment and income growth for wives” because husbands
tend to be the drivers behind moving and women tend to be “trailing
spouse[s].”285 Schoenbaum also points out that families who rely on
nonmarket caregivers for childcare, like grandparents, are less likely to
move.286 As a result, “[m]obility most jeopardizes this type of . . .
support for precisely those low-wage persons . . . [that proponents of
mobility think] should be moving more.”287
The result is that the liberaltarian approach is likely to benefit
white people of a higher socioeconomic status than other groups. Black
people and people of a lower socioeconomic status are more likely to
remain in left-behind places, along with all the attendant, negative
consequences for their economic, social, and medical well-being.
Zoning, of course, has pernicious distributive consequences of its own.
The history of zoning is bound up with issues of race-based exclusion
and the maintenance of de jure and de facto housing segregation.288
There is no doubt that zoning and land-use regulations continue to
promote segregated housing patterns.289 But the pernicious

284. Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith & Abigail Wozniak, Internal Migration in the
United States, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 173, 183 tbl.2 (2011).
285. Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place, 127
YALE L.J. F. 458, 471 (2017).
286. Id. at 469.
287. Id.
288. See generally Gretchen Boger, The Meaning of Neighborhood in the Modern City:
Baltimore’s Residential Segregation Ordinances, 1910–1913, 35 J. URB. HIST. 236 (2009)
(describing “the first American effort to separate black and white neighborhoods by law”);
Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913,
42 MD. L. REV. 289 (1983) (same).
289. See, e.g., Grabar, supra note 264 (“Single-family home zoning was devised as a legal way
to keep black Americans and other minorities from moving into certain neighborhoods, and it
still functions as an effective barrier today.”); Elliot Kaufman, Opinion, Housing Deregulation in
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distributional effects of increased mobility suggest complicated
tradeoffs; deregulating land use is not necessarily the cure-all it is
sometimes painted to be.
Even on its own terms, the liberaltarians’ deregulatory solution
raises challenges and produces costs that must also factor into any
evaluation of the approach. Local governments use zoning and density
limits to regulate the pace of community change.290 Deregulating—or
significantly relaxing zoning restrictions—would blunt that tool.291
When people choose where to live, they are choosing not only a house
or apartment but also a bundle of community characteristics that can
include public services like schools, aesthetic qualities, social capital,
and so forth.292 Sudden or dramatic changes in community character

Progressive Clothes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/housingderegulation-in-progressive-clothes-11545435296 [https://perma.cc/ME9V-JT82] (same); Jessica
Trounstine, The Geography of Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces Segregation, 114
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443, 443 (“[E]ven facially race-neutral land use policies have contributed to
racial segregation.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon
Valley, Greater New Haven, and Greater Austin 9 (Jan. 14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3472145 [https://perma.cc/P22S-MGBV] (“Exclusionary zoning,
although hardly the exclusive cause of residential segregation by social class, certainly aggravates
it.”).
290. See Serkin, supra note 52, at 771–82; Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules—The
Functioning of Zoning, 11 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 709, 710 (1986) (“[Z]oning has evolved into
a mechanism that conserves and protects existing residential communities by moderating the pace
of development and change.”).
291. Traditional justifications for zoning focus on separating incompatible uses of land. See
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). Zoning reformers tend to focus
on density limits and not on use restrictions, although contemporary rhetoric is often framed
more broadly as an opposition to zoning itself (and the two can be difficult to disentangle). See,
e.g., Dan Bertolet, Exclusionary Zoning Robs Our Cities of Their Best Qualities, SIGHTLINE
INST. (Apr. 20, 2016, 11:30 AM), https://www.sightline.org/2016/04/20/how-exclusionaryzoning-robs-our-cities-of-their-best-qualities [https://perma.cc/CMY6-F8B7] (“The height and
density limits we impose on apartment buildings can also cause exclusion if they reduce the
number of units that otherwise would have been built. In cities where lots of people want to
live, less new housing means more upward pressure on prices.”); Gillian B. White, How Zoning
Laws Exacerbate Inequality, ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2015/11/zoning-laws-and-the-rise-of-economic-inequality/417360 [https://perma.cc/
B83Y-RXRW] (“[Zoning] laws aren’t only a nuisance to developers, they’re also making
inequality worse.”); SEATTLE HOUS. AFFORDABILITY & LIVABILITY AGENDA, FINAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAYOR EDWARD B. MURRAY AND THE
SEATTLE C ITY C OUNCIL 25 (2015), http://murray.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/
HALA_Report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U36-M923] (“Seattle’s zoning has roots in racial
and class exclusion and remains among the largest obstacles to realizing the City’s goals for
equity and affordability.” (footnote omitted)).
292. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 25 (2009) (“Buying a home
means . . . buying a set of near neighbors, a neighborhood living environment, a particular degree
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threaten to undermine those choices; the characteristics people
thought they were selecting may rapidly disappear. In-place residents
must then decide whether to live in a community that no longer
satisfies their preferences or incur the costs of moving—in some cases,
again.293 Both responses are potentially burdensome. And pressures of
community change on in-place residents are not limited to these
relatively abstract welfarist concerns. Gentrification of low-income
communities can displace long-term residents.294 Zoning reduces all of
those costs by limiting the pace and extent of community change over
time.295
It is worth noting that dramatically unlocking density and its
attendant changes to the community also raises problems for one of the
fundamental theories of local political accountability. In his pioneering
work, economist Charles Tiebout hypothesized that local governments
will provide efficient levels of public services even in the absence of
price signals because housing consumers vote with their feet.296
According to his account—refined over decades in others’ work297—
people choose where to live based on the combination of property
taxes and local “services,” broadly defined, and will sort into places

of proximity to points of interest such as one’s workplace, a bundle of services and amenities
provided by the local jurisdiction . . . and a political and social address.”).
293. See Serkin, supra note 52, at 773 (“When people . . . remain in a place[] because of a
certain set of characteristics, they will experience some disutility if those characteristics change.
Of course, they could move to a place that is again more consistent with their preferences, but
that imposes its own costs.”).
294. See, e.g., John Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1271,
1285 (2020) (identifying “two key concerns expressed by residents of lower income urban
neighborhoods facing new development: fear of displacement . . . and fear of significant change
to neighborhood character”).
295. See FENNELL, supra note 292, at 39 (“Land use controls . . . work as ‘product stabilizers,’
reducing the uncertainty associated with lengthy time horizons and fragmented, interdependent
influences.”). See generally Serkin, supra note 52 (focusing on the pace of change).
296. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
417–20 (1956).
297. See generally Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending
on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J.
POL. ECON. 957 (1969) (evaluating Tiebout’s model); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property
Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975) (developing a model “very
much in the spirit of the well-known Tiebout Hypothesis” and responding to Oates, supra); James
C. Dyer IV & Michael D. Maher, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local Tax
Prices: Comment, 69 AM. ECON REV. 481 (1979) (responding to Hamilton’s modelling); Levon
Barseghyan & Stephen Coate, Property Taxation, Zoning, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Tiebout
Model, 8 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1 (2016) (proposing a new “Tiebout model”).
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that best satisfy their individual preferences.298 But this assumes
relatively stable communities or costless movement between them.
Instability in community character coupled with high costs of moving
makes sorting more difficult and undermines the central feedback
mechanism of foot-voting.299
Additionally, deregulating zoning density limits might not actually
result in less land-use regulation because property owners often have a
kind of substitute for public zoning regulations: suburban
homeowners’ associations (“HOAs”). If governments cannot satisfy
housing consumers’ land-use preferences for relative stability,
homeowners may find an alternative in the private governance of
HOAs. Housing consumers want the ability to control neighboring
property. As journalist Richard Babcock put it decades ago, “No one
is enthusiastic about zoning except the people.”300
For most homeowners, a house or an apartment represents their
single largest asset, and they demand protection for the value of that
investment, as well as protection for the use value of their home.301
Significant changes to the character of a community or
neighborhood—including dramatically increased density—can
interfere with those expectations, so people look for ways to control
neighboring uses of property. If zoning cannot provide that stability,
then homeowners may seek out private land-use controls, and they will
often have to look to the suburbs to find them. The choice facing
policymakers in the future, therefore, might not be between restrictive

298. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1073–74 (1983) (describing the sorting function in the Tiebout
Hypothesis).
299. Though the Tiebout model, as extended by Oates and others, allows for heterogeneity
of housing stock, it still requires stability over time. See Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the
Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY 21, 28 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (“So long
as the distribution of types of housing is stable over time, the differentials in tax bills become
capitalized into property values so that the basic Tiebout outcome is preserved.”).
300. Vicki Been, Josiah Madar & Simon McDonnell, Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are
Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 227 (2014) (quoting
RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 17 (1966)); see
also Kevin Drum, Zoning and Sprawl, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.motherjones.com/
kevin-drum/2010/03/zoning-and-sprawl [https://perma.cc/T8L5-4CZ7] (“[T]hese regulations aren’t
something that’s been imposed by ‘government.’ They exist because people really, really, really want
them.”).
301. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 75 (2001) (“As a result of this
enormous concentration of wealth in one asset, people who buy houses are more careful about it
than almost any other episodic transaction . . . .”).
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and relaxed zoning in the urban core; it might end up being between
public zoning regulations and private suburban ones.
Consider Houston, Texas—the most famous example of an
American city without zoning.302 Houston’s lack of zoning is something
of a canard, however. While it has no central, government-based
comprehensive zoning, most development occurs in subdivisions that
are governed by private HOA rules, rules that are often more
restrictive than in any zoning ordinance.303 This should not come as a
surprise. People willingly give up some measure of freedom over their
own property in exchange for the ability to regulate their neighbors’
property.304 This tradeoff is at the core of every HOA. If local
governments cannot satisfy regulatory preferences for control over
property, Houston is strong evidence that people will turn instead to
private agreements like HOAs to create the community stability they
want.
Some of the promise of deregulation is indeed on display in
Texas’s most populous city.305 Housing prices have not increased in
Houston at anywhere near the same pace as in other megacities, while
population has grown dramatically.306 But the effect of reliance on

302. See generally Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1970)
(describing the Houston land-use regime).
303. Professor Bernard Siegan explains the scale of the patchwork of private rules:
Officials in Houston estimate that there are 7,000 to 8,000 (perhaps as many as 10,000)
individual subdivisions and separate sections of subdivisions each of which may be
subject to restrictive covenants of varying kinds. There is general agreement that at one
time or another the vast majority were probably subject to restrictive covenants and
that most of these covenants are still in force.
Id. at 79; see also ALEXIUS MARCANO, MATTHEW FESTA & KYLE SHELTON, RICE UNIV.
KINDER INST. FOR URBAN RSCH., DEVELOPING HOUSTON: LAND-USE REGULATION IN THE
“UN-ZONED” CITY AND ITS OUTCOMES 3 (2017), https://kinder.rice.edu/sites/default/files/
documents/UnzonedCity_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8P4-MPEK] (“Instead of a formal zoning
code, though, Houston has created its own land development approach—one that mixes private
and public mechanisms to control the form and function of buildings in specific areas.”); John
Mixon, Four Land Use Vignettes from Unzoned(?) Houston, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 159, 166 (2010) (describing examples of private deed restrictions).
304. Though no one likes to be told what they can and cannot do on their own property,
everyone wants to be able to tell their neighbors what they can and cannot do on their own
property. See Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights, 92 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1078 (2019).
305. See About Houston, CITY OF HOUS., https://www.houstontx.gov/abouthouston/
houstonfacts.html [https://perma.cc/MZP3-HJRZ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
306. In a letter to then-Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Ben Carson, Policy
Researcher Emily Hamilton lauded Houston’s housing prices:
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private land-use controls is also on prominent display: Houston has
markedly less density and more sprawl than other places. According to
the last census, Houston’s population density is 266.1 housing units per
square mile.307 Compared with Miami at 437.9, Philadelphia at 531.2,
Boston at 681.4, or New York at 3,223.8, Houston is much less dense.308
More impressionistically, “As the nation’s fourth most populous city,
Houston is clearly an urban center, and yet, the lifestyle it provides is
largely suburban.”309 By one measure, Houston has become less
affordable than New York City, when factoring in transportation
costs.310
Of course, the form of development in Houston is not replicable
in many places, and while we cannot be certain how other locales will
adapt, development pressure could push out toward the suburbs or
otherwise result in more private land-use innovations as substitutes for
the lack of zoning. It is an empirical question how much elasticity there
is in demand for less regulated urban property as opposed to more
regulated suburban property, and it is undoubtedly location specific.
Significant changes in the density of many Manhattan neighborhoods
might not push people out to New Jersey or Connecticut. But changes
in Nashville might well push people out to its suburbs, like Franklin,
which are already much nearer substitutes. At the very least, for people
who advocate loosening zoning restrictions to increase density,
Houston is a cautionary tale.
The resurgence of the suburbs and suburban HOAs would
preserve all of the problems of regional inequality while creating

[I]n Houston, housing supply elasticity was 0.42 percent for the period of 1996 to 2016,
well above the national average of 0.17 percent. During this period, the city’s
population increased by half a million people, but today the median Houston home
price is $235,000. Households across a broad range of incomes can find housing that’s
affordable.
Letter from Emily Hamilton, Pol’y Rsch. Manager, State & Loc. Pol’y Project, Mercatus Ctr. at
George Mason Univ., to Ben Carson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (n.d.), https://
www.mercatus.org/system/files/hamilton_-_pic_-_hud_housing_affordability_cover_letter_-_v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UA52-HBNV].
307. Metropolitan Area Census Data: Population and Housing Density, CENSUS-CHARTS.COM,
https://www.census-charts.com/Metropolitan/Density.html [https://perma.cc/NJS9-5VQ5].
308. Id.
309. Hilary Ybarra, How Urban or Suburban Is Sprawling Houston?, RICE UNIV. KINDER
INST. FOR U RB . RSCH. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://kinder.rice.edu/2017/09/21/how-urban-orsuburban-is-sprawling-houston [https://perma.cc/6MJ8-CTSM].
310. Rent and Ride: Affordability Is About Both, CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://cbcny.org/research/rent-and-ride [https://perma.cc/A8SJ-VQDT].
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additional ones as well. Conventional accounts suggest that HOAs
“intensify social segregation, racism, and exclusionary land use
practices.”311 The history of HOAs is inextricably bound up with
whites-only communities seeking to exclude Black residents.312 HOAs
still tend to be more racially homogenous than the municipalities in
which they are located.313 Worse, there is some empirical evidence that
the presence of HOAs exacerbates segregation in the rest of the
municipality.314 They also produce all of the problems that zoning
opponents decry—restricting density, constraining supply, separating
single-family residential building from other uses—while
simultaneously being even less flexible than zoning.315 If greatly
reduced zoning in cities means that HOAs gain a new advantage in the
competition for housing consumers, that could come with significant
costs.
Ultimately, land-use deregulation may be an important part of the
response to the affordability crisis in many cities, but it is not a
complete response to geographic inequality more broadly. In fairness,
most of its advocates do not intend it to be. But increasing access to
superstar urban areas could result in a new equilibrium that

311. SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES 11 (2003) (discussing gated residential communities).
See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA (1996) (analyzing HOAs).
312. See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45, 74 (2010) (“The
neighborhood homeowners’ association formed the key centerpiece of White efforts to organize
residential segregation.”).
313. See, e.g., TRACY M. GORDON, PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA: PRIVATE
COMMUNITIES AND PUBLIC LIFE vii (2004), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_
304TGR.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB87-GX26] (“Planned developments are less diverse with
respect to race and ethnicity than other neighborhoods.”); Elena Vesselinov, Matthew Cazessus
& William Falk, Gated Communities and Spatial Inequality, 29 J. URB. AFFS. 109, 114 (2007)
(citing literature supporting claim that gated communities, in particular, “remain largely
homogeneous enclaves”).
314. See Rachel Meltzer, Do Homeowners Associations Affect Citywide Segregation?
Evidence from Florida Municipalities, 23 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 688, 705 (2013). Professor Rachel
Meltzer explained:
Results suggest that changes in the presence of HOAs do influence racial/ethnic
segregation. Specifically, a 10% increase in the number of HOA units (approximately
240, based on the sample mean) can cause up to a 2% increase in the indexed level of
black–white segregation and a 1% increase in the indexed level of Hispanic–white
segregation (depending on the measure).
Id.
315. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1395
(1994) (describing covenants as providing “a stabilizing precommitment device against changing
preferences”); see also Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697,
768 (2010).
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exacerbates the underlying problems of regional divergence.
Moreover, it could create its own costs, reducing cities’ ability to
compete as effectively with nearby suburbs.
We are not opposed to zoning and land-use reforms. Indeed, we
think there are opportunities to increase density and agree that
NIMBYism can be socially oppressive. But we do intend to sound a
cautionary note.
B. Place-Based Economics
Unlike liberaltarians, who seek to relocate individuals, some
policymakers and economists have proposed adopting “place-based
policies,” which could help improve economic conditions in longsuffering areas. These policies come in two flavors—a narrow, centrist
approach and a broader approach focused on reviving industrial policy.
1. The Centrist Approach. One of the more notable recent papers
in the centrist vein comes from economists Benjamin Austin, Edward
Glaeser, and Lawrence Summers.316 Recognizing the link between
geography and social problems, Austin, Glaeser, and Summers assess
three possible reasons for place-based policies. The first is
agglomeration economics—that colocating economic development
might lead to further growth.317 They note, however, that this does not
justify “spatially heterogeneous” policies because “it is impossible to
know whether a relocation of capital and labor from Los Angeles to
Kentucky will lead to benefits in Kentucky that are large enough to
offset the losses in Los Angeles.”318 Second, they consider “insuring
against local shocks” as a justification.319 But they dismiss this argument
partly because it would distort migration and capitalization.320 They
conclude that the best argument for place-based policies is that market
failures are better addressed at the local level, given both the diversity
of economies across the country and the bang for the buck achieved in
having a more focused approach.321
316. See Austin et al., supra note 29, at 151.
317. Id. at 212.
318. Id. at 212–13.
319. Id. at 179.
320. Id. at 179–80.
321. Id. at 180; see also id. at 153 (“The most compelling case for place-based policies is that
one-size-fits-all interventions are woefully inappropriate for regional economies as diverse as
Appalachia and Silicon Valley.”).
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Austin, Glaeser, and Summers also offer a “taxonomy of placebased policies” that includes direct public investment, tax benefits for
businesses and individuals, and deregulation.322 They are lukewarm at
best on public investment, including infrastructure spending because
they worry that returns to contemporary infrastructure projects will be
lower than the transformative infrastructure projects of the midtwentieth century.323 They also identify “regulatory relief”—but not
affirmative regulatory policy—as a possible place-based policy.324 This
is surprising because, as we have shown, a wide variety of affirmative
regulatory policies, such as antitrust, transportation, and
communications, all have significant spatial consequences. Instead, the
centrist position largely focuses on providing tax benefits to address
employment. For example, Austin, Glaeser, and Summers suggest,
among other things, “implicit taxes on housing vouchers and food
stamps could be reduced for low-income workers from 30 percent to
20 percent in areas where employment is particularly responsive to the
returns to working.”325
Though we are not categorically opposed to using the tax code for
achieving public policy goals, we are skeptical of the claim that targeted
tax benefits, whether to corporations or individuals, should be the sole
or even primary focus for place-based policies. First, it is not clear that
giving corporations tax benefits is a good use of money, particularly
when that money could instead be spent directly on improving the
economy in those areas. Second, companies often value places that
have social, physical, and economic infrastructure to support their
operations—even if they don’t offer the biggest tax benefits.326 That
Amazon initially chose to locate its new headquarters in New York and
metropolitan Washington, D.C., over Memphis or Omaha is selfexplanatory.327 Third, at the individual level, making policy through the
322. Id. at 209.
323. See id. at 218–20.
324. Id. at 217.
325. Id. at 154.
326. For example, a number of “losing” cities offered Amazon more money than the “winning”
areas for the company’s new headquarters. Aaron Mak, Here Are the Outrageous Incentives That
Losing Cities Offered Amazon for HQ2, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://slate.com/
technology/2018/11/amazon-hq2-incredible-incentives-losing-cities-offered.html [https://perma.cc/
GK6X-L5UQ].
327. See Jeffrey Dastin & David Shepardson, Amazon Picks New York City, Washington D.C.
Area for New Offices, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://reut.rs/2zPwLrM [https://
perma.cc/N4PH-TKFK]; Alison Griswold, A Nearly Complete List of the 238 Places that Bid for
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tax code is not ideal. Depending on how it is designed, individuals may
have to figure out how to get the benefit—and remember to do so—at
tax time.328 If the tax benefit is a shift in rates, then it is unlikely to be
salient to individuals and may have less of a stimulative effect.329
Fourth, the tax policy approach does not have the same political
benefits that more direct forms of policy action might have. One of the
great benefits of the New Deal–era place-based policies, like the
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), the Works Progress
Administration’s programs, and Rural Electrification, was to show the
general public that government was on their side, working for them and
delivering important benefits to their region.330 As Professor Suzanne
Mettler argues in her book The Submerged State, hidden programs
undermine democracy because they “obscure the role of the
government and exaggerate that of the market, leaving citizens
unaware of how power operates.”331 The Obama administration’s tax
cuts in the stimulus bill of 2009 are a good example of this
phenomenon. They lowered taxes for some 95 percent of working
Americans—but a year later, only 12 percent of Americans believed
the Obama administration had lowered their taxes.332 Place-based
policies should be salient in order to maintain support for those
policies.
More broadly, while they recognize the need for place-based
policies, Austin, Glaeser, and Summers do not argue that geographic
equality and inequality are a function of law and public policy. Even
though they recognize that there is no longer regional convergence in
incomes,333 they do not provide an account of why regional inequality
is growing beyond suggesting the possible influence of agglomeration

Amazon’s Next Headquarters, QUARTZ (Nov. 4, 2017), https://qz.com/1119945 [https://perma.cc/
C6PJ-JY3K].
328. For a sharp critique, see Jack Meserve, Keep It Simple and Take Credit, DEMOCRACY: J.
IDEAS (Feb. 3, 2017, 5:42 PM), https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/keep-it-simple-and-takecredit [https://perma.cc/BW5Z-5VJ2].
329. See, e.g., MARK M. ZANDI, ASSESSING THE MACRO ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FISCAL
STIMULUS 2008, at 3 tbl.1 (2008), https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/StimulusImpact-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/79X5-MW8J] (comparing the fiscal stimulus effect on GDP of
various policies and showing that tax benefits are consistently below infrastructure spending and
social safety net spending).
330. See Meserve, supra note 328.
331. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE 6 (2011).
332. Id. at 92.
333. See Austin et al., supra note 29, at 152.
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economies. The problem is that the sites of economic growth are
themselves partly dependent on public policy. To be fair, they do note
the geographic effect of the creation of the TVA on the Tennessee
economy and of land-grant colleges throughout the country.334 But
despite this admission, Austin, Glaeser, and Summers do not make the
further generalization that deliberate public policies with targeted
spatial effects were an important part of the era of economic
convergence, even if not the sole factor driving convergence.
2. The Return of Industrial Policy. The admission that policy
choices like land-grant colleges and the TVA have an impact on the
economy suggests a second type of place-based economics—industrial
policy. The idea of a geographically focused industrial policy is not a
new one. During the New Deal, for example, the federal government
sponsored public works projects and investments all across the
country.335 Economic studies show that these projects “increased
consumption activity, attracted internal migration, reduced crime
rates, and lowered several types of mortality.”336
In recent years, policymakers on the right and left have proposed
reviving a more deliberate, conscious industrial policy in America.
Industrial policy involves government investment in sectors of the
economy to boost growth, jobs, and the success of those sectors. In a
2019 report, Republican Senator Marco Rubio observed that industrial
policy is always inevitable for a country: “The critical policy
consideration, then, is not whether states should organize their
economies, but how they should be organized.”337 He then argues that
American economic policy should seek to “benefit working Americans
and the[ir] families” recognizing that this view has geographic

334. Austin et al., supra note 29, at 209–10.
335. See, e.g., Map, LIVING NEW DEAL, https://livingnewdeal.org/map [https://perma.cc/
T8WC-GNFR] (mapping New Deal projects across the country).
336. Price V. Fishback, How Successful Was the New Deal? The Microeconomic Impact of
New Deal Spending and Lending Policies in the 1930s 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 21925, 2016), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21925/w21925.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68W8-4SH7] (providing an overview of the literature).
337. See U.S. S. C OMM . ON S MALL B US . & E NTREPRENEURSHIP , 116th Cong.,
M ADE IN C HINA : 2025 AND THE F UTURE OF A MERICAN I NDUSTRY 6 (2019), https://
www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d1c6db46-1a68-481a-b96e-356c8100f1b7/
3EDECA923DB439A8E884C6229A4C6003.02.12.19-final-sbc-project-mic2025-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YL7-UBF2].
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implications.338 “[M]anufacturing generally provides more stable
employment than services,” he writes, “and geographic proximity to
large production facilities encourages small business dynamism.”339
On the other side of the aisle, Democratic Senator Elizabeth
Warren has proposed a plan for “economic patriotism” that includes
heavy investment in research and development (“R&D”) throughout
the country.340 “R&D investments must be spread across every region
of the country, not focused on only a few coastal cities,” she says.341
“There are talented Americans in every part of the country, but too
often cities and towns experience brain drain and shrink because
corporations move jobs and opportunities overseas or to a small
handful of American cities.”342 Economists Simon Johnson and
Jonathan Gruber have identified 102 urban communities outside of the
superstar cities that could be hubs for their “Jump-Starting America”
plan.343 Under their plan, the federal government would invest heavily
in science, R&D, and commercialization of inventions in these areas
that cumulatively represent 80 million Americans across thirty-six
states and every region.344
The revival of a geographically mindful industrial policy is a far
more promising approach to place-based economics than the centrist
focus on tax policy for the reasons stated above; we spend less time on
it because our focus in this Article is on policies that are generally
considered regulatory in nature.
*

*

*

The liberaltarian and the centrist approaches are both limited in
their ability to address geographic inequality. They also largely ignore
how deregulation contributed to the widening of geographic inequality
in America. Given that regulatory choices invariably shape the
distribution of wealth, what has been missing in the debate over

338. See id.
339. Id.
340. See Elizabeth Warren, A Plan for Economic Patriotism, MEDIUM (June 4, 2019), https://
link.medium.com/ARrZ2Csc0cb [https://perma.cc/2YGT-RG43].
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. JONATHAN GRUBER & SIMON JOHNSON, JUMP-STARTING AMERICA app., at 231–42 (2019),
appendix available at 102 Places for Jump-Starting America, JUMP-STARTING AM., https://www.jumpstartingamerica.com/102-places-for-jumpstarting-america [https://perma.cc/ND8K-2ZQW].
344. See id. at 113–36.
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geographic inequality is how regulatory policy could mitigate these
growing divides. Part IV takes up this discussion.
IV. REGULATION AND REVITALIZATION
Part II documented numerous ways in which the Progressive Era
and New Deal regulatory order in the United States promoted
dispersion of economic activity and thereby encouraged geographic
convergence in economic outcomes. The unraveling of this regulatory
order around 1980 coincided with the end of convergence and the
beginning of the era of widening geographic inequality. Federal
regulatory policy, we contend, can profoundly affect the geography of
economic growth and opportunity.
This Part sketches a preliminary path forward, describing several
ways in which regulatory policy can respond to geographic inequality.
These include reviving regulated industries and public options as well
as incorporating geographic considerations into regulatory
policymaking.
A. Reviving Regulated Industries and Public Options
Transportation and communications resources are part of the
infrastructural foundation of economic growth and development. As
we have seen, under the currently prevailing regulatory model, smaller
communities and rural states must pay comparatively high prices to
access these resources, if they have access at all. This is the logic of
marginal-cost pricing, and it rewards concentration rather than
dispersion of economic activity and business investment.
History shows that another regulatory model is theoretically
available—the one that dominated federal regulation of long-distance
transportation and communications industries for much of the
twentieth century. The broad contours of this regulatory approach are
clear. Its basic design components are rate regulation, service
mandates, and entry restriction. Rate regulation allows internal crosssubsidies to be generated and allocated to less-dense regions. Service
mandates, such as universal service requirements,345 direct regulated
firms to provide adequate service throughout their designated service
areas. And entry restriction rules prevent opportunistic “cream

345. See, e.g., Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 955–57 (1997).
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skimming” in denser areas or routes, where prices are held above
marginal cost. In essence, as Posner observed, the effect is to impose a
tax on users in denser areas to subsidize users in sparser regions.346
As noted above, Senator Byrd in 1986 said he “would welcome the
opportunity to vote for reregulation” of the airlines.347 Even so,
resurrecting and modernizing this mode of regulation would not be
perfect or without tradeoffs. Specifically, rate regulation is
cumbersome to administer and generates well-understood incentive
problems for regulated firms, including incentives to engage in nonprice competition and incentives to overinvest.348 Entry restriction
might hamper innovation,349 and this regulatory model tends to
suppress competition in favor of system integration and service
mandates. These drawbacks are real.
But the current era of geographic inequality sheds new light on the
countervailing benefits of this regulatory model—benefits that could
be enormous but have been insufficiently appreciated or understood.
Traditional infrastructure regulation can serve as a crucial
counterweight to the economics of agglomeration by promoting
dispersion of business investment and economic activity. This would
benefit rural states and smaller communities by supporting economic
growth and opportunity. It would also alleviate the affordability crisis
in superstar cities because fewer people would be seeking to cram in.
In short, regulatory tools could lessen our current, severe
maldistribution of economic growth and opportunity.
True, similar results might theoretically be achievable through
standard tax-and-transfer machinery. For example, the federal
government could subsidize private infrastructure providers to offer
reasonable-cost service in more remote areas. But in reality, such
subsidies have a variety of downsides. They implicate many of the same
informational and incentive problems that arise in traditional
infrastructure regulation, and all taxation methods affect incentives
and have implementation costs. As noted above, financing through
cross-subsidies rather than through general revenues also removes
these decisions from the ordinary appropriations and political process,
346. Posner, supra note 108, at 39–40.
347. 132 CONG. REC. 5107 (1986) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd).
348. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1449, 1454–55 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
Willig eds., 1989).
349. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, DEREGULATION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 6 (2009)
(asserting that deregulation has resulted in “enhanced rates of product and process innovation”).
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sealing off infrastructure resources into self-sustaining systems with
dedicated revenue streams. To the extent that dedicated crosssubsidies are more reliable than annual appropriations and less subject
to political capture, they can promote efficient ex ante reliance on
infrastructure resources. In particular, infrastructure-reliant businesses
will invest more readily if they have more assurance that infrastructural
systems will have staying power. Indeed, as one example of the
challenge, compare subsidies to private providers of internet service
with Chattanooga’s public provision of broadband. Chattanooga
wanted to offer its successful high-speed internet to surrounding
areas,350 only to have the state preempt local expansion of the service.351
The state then chose to offer $45 million in subsidies to Comcast and
AT&T to provide 10 Mbps download speed internet, which is 1,000
times slower than what Chattanooga could have provided without
subsidies.352
Instead of subsidizing private providers, the direct public
provision of goods and services, particularly infrastructural goods and
services, can provide considerable benefits to underserved areas. The
postal system adopted free delivery for rural customers in the Populist
Era and Parcel Post in the Progressive Era.353 The New Dealers
pursued rural electrification and the TVA. Creating the interstate
highway system was a major public-sector initiative of the midtwentieth century.354 Each of these policies involved public action to
expand access geographically to a basic good of modern life. Today,
the closest analogy is to high-speed internet. As the Chattanooga
example shows, access to high-speed internet can be a boon to a mid350. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
351. Lauren C. Williams, Rural Tennesseans Could Have Gotten Free Internet but Their Legislators
Shut It Down, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 17, 2017, 5:57 PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/ruraltennesseans-internet-government-5853341d3c0c/ [https://perma.cc/UWK7-EWQM].
352. Id.
353. See WINIFRED GALLAGHER, HOW THE POST OFFICE CREATED AMERICA 207 (2016).
Journalist Winifred Gallagher noted that, with the advent of Parcel Post in 1913,
Sears’s orders quintupled during the first year. Suddenly, rural Americans who needed
a new bed or table, dress or shirt, didn’t have to overpay or make it themselves;
moreover, they could have the same model as residents of Boston or
Chicago . . . . [T]he post had become the greatest distributing organization on earth.
Id.
354. Celebrating 50 Years: The Eisenhower Interstate Highway System: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Highways, Transit, & Pipelines of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure,
109th Cong. 29–33 (2006) (statement of J. Richard Capka, Administrator, Federal Highway
Administration).
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sized community and its surrounding region—and, unsurprisingly, is
extremely popular across the political spectrum.355
A public option for high-speed internet, and public options for
other goods and services, can serve as an alternative to sectoral
economic regulation.356 Direct government provision that coexists with
the marketplace expands access to important social goods, particularly
infrastructural goods. But it does so without regulating private sector
rates and entry. Instead, the public option offers an alternative to a
private option—and, for some populations, may offer the only
affordable option. In any case, public provision can help address
geographic inequality between rural and urban areas and between
superstar cities and mid-sized cities. And, at the very least, the federal
government could preempt states from blocking local efforts to
experiment with the provision of public options like municipal
broadband.357
Finally, as Professor K. Sabeel Rahman demonstrates, the
provision of infrastructural goods plays an important role in
guaranteeing equality and opportunity across racial lines because it
minimizes bureaucratic barriers, privatization, and fragmentation of
these goods.358 Bureaucratic barriers make it harder for people to
access public goods.359 Privatization, Rahman argues, “transfers the
financing and control of these goods from public hands to private
operators and financial investors, introducing problematic revenue-

355. For a discussion of the popularity of expanding internet access across the political
spectrum, see Sean McElwee, Ganesh Sitaraman & Jon Green, Why Democrats Should Embrace
‘Internet for All,’ NATION (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/democratsembrace-internet [https://perma.cc/6UJ4-Z9CU].
356. See GANESH SITARAMAN & ANNE L. ALSTOTT, THE PUBLIC OPTION: HOW TO EXPAND
FREEDOM, INCREASE OPPORTUNITY, AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 3 (2019) (“[T]he public option
is often attractive because it offers a high-quality service for a reasonable price. But it is an option,
competing directly with other options provided by the private market—a form of competition
that can be beneficial to both the public and the private realm.”).
357. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163,
1172 (2018) (describing the problem of preemption in the context of broadband services). See
generally RICHARD BRIFFAULT, NESTOR DAVIDSON, PAUL A. DILLER, OLATUNDE JOHNSON &
RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER, THE TROUBLING TURN IN STATE PREEMPTION: THE ASSAULT ON
PROGRESSIVE CITIES AND HOW CITIES CAN RESPOND (2017), https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief_-_Preemption_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D2U-4C4Q]
(describing state preemption of local initiatives).
358. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through the
Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2447, 2468 (2018).
359. Id. at 2452.
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generating incentives and shrouding the goods from greater public
accountability.”360 Meanwhile, fragmentation “limits putative equal
access regimes through decentralization,” which ultimately denies
access to some communities.361 A revival of the regulated industries
and public option models could therefore help advance racial equality
in addition to geographic equality.
B. Incorporating Geographic Considerations into Regulatory Policy
In antitrust, trade, and regulatory policy more broadly, both
ideological and technical reforms could be helpful. The Chicago School
approach that has dominated antitrust since the late 1970s has the
effect of exacerbating geographic inequality. The go-go liberalization
approach to trade policy has been similar. Though the obvious solution
is to jettison or temper the ideologies undergirding the approach to
these sectors, in the meantime, an additional, narrower option would
be to incorporate geographic inequality into the analysis in these and
other areas of policy.
First, in trade policy, Congress could amend the law to require the
ITC to assess the geographic impact of proposed trade agreements.
The ITC already conducts studies of proposed agreements’ economic
impacts across sectors.362 Adding a geographic component would help
Congress understand the full consequences of the agreement. The
resulting data would also create political pressure to adopt more
effective mitigation measures for the areas hardest hit by trade
agreements.
Second, and more broadly, the president could issue an executive
order requiring all agencies to consider the geographic impact of their
regulatory choices. Currently, executive branch agencies consider a
variety of impacts when explaining their regulatory choices as part of
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. For example, they are
required to consider the impact on federalism,363 and some are even
required to consult a panel of small businesses to evaluate the impact

360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
363. See Federalism, Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. at 206, 207 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 note at 828 (2018).
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on those entities.364 President Barack Obama issued an executive order
asking agencies to consider actions they could take to promote
competitive markets, though the order did not require doing so in
rulemakings.365 Congress could pass a law, or a president could issue an
executive order, requiring agencies to take into account the geographic
impact of their regulatory actions, including during rulemaking.
An executive order to this effect would have two consequences.
First, agencies would have to consider the geographic consequences of
their actions ex ante and make the determination that its actions are
beneficial, even in spite of geographic costs. This process might lead to
agencies making different policy choices. Second, the agency’s analysis
and decision would create various ex post consequences. Regulated
entities could challenge the agency’s analysis and conclusions as
arbitrary and capricious. Members of Congress would have a foothold
for agency oversight on the issue. And both members of Congress and
other agencies could look for ways to mitigate the negative
consequences of regulatory actions with significant geographic
impacts.
Lastly, and most aspirationally, shining light on the policy drivers
of regional inequality should open a debate about potential policy
responses more broadly. This requires, first and foremost, jettisoning
the casual and false assumption that regional inequality is the result of
exogenous economic forces that land-use regulations must
accommodate. Policy choices have helped drive the concentration of
economic opportunity, and yet policymakers have been largely let off
the hook. There is little political pressure on government to respond,
and the pressure has been almost entirely directed—or misdirected—
at local governments for their protectionist land-use policies. The fact
is, currently left-behind places have the political power in Congress to
champion policies that will spread economic opportunity more
broadly. Elevating the effects of federal policies on geographic
inequality should increase the political temperature for members of
Congress who fail to account for these consequences.

364. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
tit. II, sec. 222, § 30(c), 110 Stat. 857, 861 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 657(c) (2018)).
365. Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support
Continued Growth of the American Economy, Exec. Order No. 13,725, 3 C.F.R. 452, 452–53
(2017), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 842–43.
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CONCLUSION
Geographic inequality is widely understood as one of the central
economic, social, and political challenges of our time. But the debate
around its causes and remedies has largely left out the role that
regulatory policy has played. Geographic inequality, like economic
inequality more broadly, is a function of public policy choices. As we
have shown, many areas of federal regulatory policy—transportation,
communications, trade, and antitrust among them—once accounted
for the geographic distribution of economic opportunities through
their design, procedures, or effects. The turn to deregulation in these
areas has, unsurprisingly, been accompanied by geographic divergence.
Recognizing the central role of law and policy in shaping geographic
inequality is the first step to addressing it.

